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GONE WITH THE WATER - DRAINAGE RIGHTS AND
STORM WATER MANAGEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA
R.

TIMOTHY WESTONt

IS BLESSED with abundant water resources.
PENNSYLVANIA
With an average annual precipitation of thirty to sixty inches,'
the Commonwealth ranks among the wettest states. 2 Its 10.5 million
acres of forest, farms, and urban areas form the watersheds of 45,000
miles of surface streams and constitute substantial drainage basins
for four major interstate rivers. Annual direct runoff to surface
waters averages from 4.73 to 7.09 trillion gallons, 3 and another 9.45
4
to 11.81 trillion gallons is recharged to groundwater aquifers.
Pennsylvania's bounty has, at times, also been the scourge of its
citizens. Flooding has damaged human settlements from the earliest
days of the colonial proprietors. 5 Urban, industrial and commercial
development, as well as clearing land for agriculture and mining,
has simultaneously increased runoff and placed valuable structures
and investments in the path of floodwaters. Since 1936 - just fortyone years ago - Pennsylvanians have suffered eighteen major
floods, each accounting for damages in excess of $1 million. Total
damages from these eighteen floods alone amounted to more than
$5.5 billion. 6 Although there is a tendency to look upon the great
floods, such as the disasters of 1936, 1972, and 1977, as remote and
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unprecedented events, the fact is that serious and moderate floods
are a part of the regular and natural history of the Commonwealth.
Drainage law and storm water management are matters of
public, as well as private, concern. The ability of one owner to
develop land, install impervious surfaces, alter drainage paths, and
accelerate runoff onto other properties involves m'bre than issues of
what rights and relief should be accorded neighboring property
owners. Urbanization may double or triple the peak flows of fiveand ten-year floods. 7 Lands far downstream may be severely affected
by the cumulative impact of unplanned and unregulated changes in
drainage patterns due to urban clearance, grading, and development. Increasingly, the costs of uncontrolled drainage modifications
and storm water management have fallen on the state and federal
budgets. Taxpayers of Pennsylvania and the nation have repeatedly
been called upon to finance the reconstruction of communities
inundated by floodwaters and the restoration of roads, utilities, and
other public services. After Hurricane Agnes, for example, the
Commonwealth appropriated $290 million for flood relief;8 an
additional $1.5 billion was contributed by the federal government. 9
Many millions more were lost through unemployment and tax
adjustments on damaged properties and businesses. To the extent
that these damages could be limited or reduced by reasonable flood
plain and storm water planning and management, the public clearly
has a stake in the development of rational legal and institutional
approaches to these goals.
The purpose of this article is to explore the interrelated issues of
drainage rights, storm water and flood control programs, and flood
plain management. The first two sections of the article will explain
the development of common law rules governing drainage of lands
and liability to adjacent property owners. Part III discusses the past
and current approaches to defining municipal responsibility for the
control and management of storm water runoff from highways and
urban development through storm sewer systems and regulatory
controls. The relationship of state and federal flood control, water
obstruction regulation, erosion reduction, and flood plain programs
to storm water problems is the subject of Part IV.
7. See REGIONAL SCIENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY OF THE
WISSAHICKON WATERSHED WITHIN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, pt. 1, at 72 (1973)
(prepared for the City of Philadelphia); Hammer, Stream Channel Enlargement Due
to Urbanization,8 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 1530, 1534-40 (1972). See generally
L.B. LEOPOLD, HYDROLOGY FOR URBAN LAND USE PLANNERS - A GUIDEBOOK ON
THE HYDROLOGIC EFFECTS OF URBAN LAND USE (U.S. Geol. Surv. Circ. 554, 1968).
8. Hearings on Senate Bill 1122 Before the Pa. Senate EnvironmentalResources
Committee 2 (March 7, 1974) (statement of Maurice K. Goddard) (on file with the Pa.
Senate Envir. Resources Comm.).
9. Id.
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In the context of this article, it is not possible to provide a
definitive answer to each of the questions raised. Rather, the purpose
is to provide a comprehensive statement of the legal and institutional background of drainage and storm water issues in order to
allow an informed and thoughtful public discussion of possible
legislative, regulatory, judicial, and administrative approaches to
resolve these questions in a manner that will best serve Pennsylvania's citizens.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW DRAINAGE RULES

A.

Common Law Classifications of Water

Hydrologists and water resource scientists generally consider all
water to be part of a unitary hydrologic cycle, irrespective of its
location on the surface or underground at any point in time. 10 The
legal profession, on the other hand, has "coped with the complexity
of water by trying to compartmentalize it."1 For the purposes of
drainage rights, two "natural" divisions of waters on the surface of
the earth - surface waters in defined watercourses and lakes, and
diffused surface waters - have been distinguished under the
common law of Pennsylvania and most other American jurisdictions. 12 Different rules governing adjacent owners' rights to direct
and dispose of waters have been developed for each of these
classifications. Therefore, before exploring the interstices of drainage law, a clear understanding of these categories is necessary.
13
"Diffused surface water," often referred to as "surface water"
in common law decisions, encompasses the uncollected flow from
falling rain or melting snow and waters which flow from springs
and diffuse over the surface of the earth. 4 Diffused surface waters
include all surface waters which are not contained in defined lakes,
ponds, or watercourses.
The definition of "watercourse" does not follow a uniform
prescription but varies in accordance with the legal context. Two
distinct meanings have been discerned, one used "when referring to
10. See 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 16.
11. Thomas & Leopold, Ground Water in North America, 143 SCIENCE 1001 (1964).
12. See Kunkle v. Ford City Borough, 305 Pa. 416, 158 A. 159 (1931); Kislinski v.
Gilboy, 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 453, 454-55 (1902); 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 450.5, at
485 (R.E. Clark ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 5 WATER RIGHTS].
13. For the purposes of this report, the term "diffused surface water" will be used
to denote water flowing over or standing upon the land surface which has not reached
a defined lake or watercourse. Following the accepted hydrologic nomenclature,
"surface waters" will mean all waters on the surface of the land, including streams,
lakes, and diffused surface waters.
14. See 1 C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 516-19 (2d ed. 1912); 1
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 52.1; 56 AM. JUR. Waters § 65 (1947); 93 C.J.S. Waters

§§ 112-113 (1956).
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that watercourse in and to which riparian rights may attach, and
the other when referring to that watercourse through which an upper
landowner may discharge water from his land."' 15 While the courts,
including those of Pennsylvania, have not always recognized or
respected this distinction, it is nevertheless important in the proper
application of drainage rules.
The most commonly quoted definitions of "streams" and
"watercourses" are derived from cases that attempted to delineate
those watercourses to which riparian rights could attach. In this
context, "[t]he terms 'watercourse' or 'natural stream' refer to water
flowing in a definite channel with a bed and banks or sides."'1 6 The
general elements of a watercourse are a channel, consisting of a welldefined bed and banks, a current of water, and a source, with a flow
and a place of discharge usually being implied. However, too much
emphasis should not be placed upon the presence of any one of these
characteristics, as none of them are considered to be absolute
17
components of a watercourse.
This formulation of the term "watercourse" has been accepted in
Pennsylvania with respect to drainage issues, as well as questions
involving riparian rights. In the seminal case of Kislinski v.
Gilboy,'8 the superior court provided the following definition of a
watercourse:
[A] stream of water usually flowing in a definite channel having
a bed and sides, or banks, and discharging itself into some other
stream or body of water . .

. Mere drainage over the general

surface of land is very different from the flow of a stream or
brook across the premises of another. In general the channel and
banks formed by the flowing of the water must present to the eye
on a casual glance, the unmistakable evidence of the frequent
action of running water . .

.;

but, the water need not flow

continually, and there are many water courses which are
sometimes dry. There is, however, a distinction to be taken in
law between a regular flowing stream of water, which at certain
seasons is dried up, and those occasional bursts of water, which
in times of freshet, or melting of ice and snow descend from the
hills and inundate the country. 19
15. Annot., 81 A.L.R. 262-63 (1932), quoting Thompson v. Andrews, 39 S.D. 477,
484, 165 N.W. 9, 11 (1917); see Annot., 40 A.L.R. 839 (1926).
16. 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 52.1(B), at 308; 93 C.J.S. Waters §§ 3-4 (1956);

39 P.L.E. Waters § 1, at 446 (1961).
17. See 93 C.J.S. Waters § 4(a) (1956).

18. 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 453 (1902).
19. Id. at 454-55 (citations omitted), quoted with approval in Kunkle v. Ford City
Borough, 305 Pa. 416, 419-20, 158 A. 159, 160-61 (1931).
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A constant flow of water is not necessary to establish the
existence of a stream; flow may be periodic. Occasional surface
water discharges during extraordinary rains or snow melts are not
sufficient to define a watercourse. However, where a discernible
channel and banks have been established over the years by a
periodic flow of water, a natural watercourse will normally be found
to exist. 2°
Some drainage rights cases from other jurisdictions have
recognized even more liberal watercourse definitions. In delineating
a stream for purposes of drainage, as opposed to riparian water use,
some courts have rejected a test requiring "definite and well-marked
sides or banks." For example, in the Illinois Supreme Court's view, a
watercourse would be found "[i]f the surface water in fact uniformly
or habitually flows off over a given course, having reasonable limits
as to width. '2 1 Some courts, in deciding drainage rights cases, have
found watercourses or drainage courses to exist even where grass
22
grew in the channel and flows were only sporadic.
Although no Pennsylvania opinions have adopted such broad
formulations, the trend of decisions in the Commonwealth has been
to favor relatively liberal tests of watercourses for drainage pur23
poses.
In this regard, it should be noted that watercourses need not be
exclusively natural. For the purposes of classifications to determine
drainage rights, it is not necessary that the flow of water be entirely
from a natural source, or that the entire watercourse be contained in
a natural channel. 24 Several Pennsylvania decisions have treated
manmade ditches and artificially modified channels as "ancient
25
watercourses" to which the drainage rules of streams apply.
20. 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 52.1(b). In describing the types of periodic
water flows which assume the characteristics of a natural watercourse, one

commentator has remarked that: "Surface waters from rainfall, melting snows, and
springs which seep, percolate, or flow over the surface of the earth lose their character
of 'diffused surface waters' and become a watercourse when the flow follows a
reasonably well-defined channel with banks and bed." Id., citing Hutchinson v.
Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 101 P. 1059 (1909), and Gray v. Reclamation
Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917).
21. Lambert v. Alcorn, 144 Ill. 313, 324, 33 N.E. 53, 56 (1893). Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota has decided that if a depression is the usual and natural
channel along which the surface water has been accustomed to flow, and the channel
bears the marks of water having flowed through it, a watercourse exists. Jungblum v.
Minneapolis New Ulm & Southwestern R.R., 70 Minn. 153, 157, 72 N.W. 971, 972
(1897).
22. See, e.g., Reichert v. Northern Pac. Ry., 39 N.D.. 114, 167 N.W. 127 (1918).
23. See notes 114-127 and accompanying text infra.
24. See Chowchilla Farms, Inc. v. Martin, 219 Cal. 1, 25 P.2d 435 (1933); San
Gabriel Valley Country Club v. County of Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 392,188 P. 554 (1920);
Weck v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 80 Cal. App. 2d 182, 181 P.2d 935
(1947). See also 93 C.J.S. Waters §4(b), at 597 (1956).
25. See Munn v. Mayor of Pittsburgh, 40 Pa. 364 (1861) (sewer which replaced
natural stream treated as stream); Rohrer v. Harrisburg, 20 Pa.*Super. Ct. 543 (1902)
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B. Introduction to Common Law Drainage Doctrines
In American jurisdictions, three basic legal doctrines have been
applied to questions concerning the drainage of surface waters.
These doctrines are commonly referred to as the "civil law,"
"common enemy," and "reasonable use" rules. 26 These three rules,
their progeny and mutations, differ substantiall in their origins,
basic theories, and fundamental policies. Each has inherent benefits
and critical flaws, at least in their pure form.
1. The Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule of drainage accords the owner of upland
property the right to drain surface waters onto lower lands and
correspondingly imposes upon lower owners a duty to receive surface
waters from higher lands.2 7 Thus, the civil law rule grants the owner
of the higher or dominant land an easement of natural flow over the
lower or servient land and prohibits a possessor of lower land from
obstructing the natural flow of diffused surface water or watercourses from upper lands. 28 In its pure form, however, the doctrine
does not recognize any right in the upper landowner to increase the
burden on the lower land by accelerating the rate or enlarging the
amount of runoff.29 The lower owner has a right of action when the
upland owner or another party interferes with natural conditions or
causes water to be discharged in a greater quantity or in a different
30
manner than would occur naturally.
The civil law doctrine is derived from Roman Law and the
Napoleonic Code.3 ' Allegedly, the rule finds its basis in the "natural
law" of drainage, as expressed in the maxim aqua currit, et debet
curere, ut solebat ex jure naturae(water runs, and ought to run, as it
32
is wont to do by natural right).
Like many areas of water law founded upon maxims and
homilies, 33 the pure civil law rule did not prove satisfactory and has
(ditches along road, although not natural watercourses, had history of continued
sanction by local authorities and were treated as natural course of water). But see
Lorah v. Amity Township, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 529 (1908).
26. See 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 52.1; Dobbins, Surface Water Drainage,
36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 518 (1961); Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface
Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891 (1940).
27. 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 452.1; Hanks, The Law of Water in New
Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 688 (1968).
28. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 26, at 894.
29. Dobbins, supra note 26, at 519.
30. 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 52.1(A)(2).
31. Dobbins, supra note 26, at 518 & n.6.
32. Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 406, 413 (1856); Dobbins, supra note 26, at 518
& n.2. See also 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 52.1(A), at 305.
33. For a discussion of similar maxim-oriented common law doctrines, see R.
WESTON & M. GANG, GROUND WATER LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA (Pa. State Water Plan
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been modified substantially. The claimed advantage of the civil law
rule is "predictability, in that responsibility for diversion of surface
waters is fixed, all things being relatively equal.

'34

On the other

hand, the rule, in pure form, arguably "tends to inhibit development
and improvement of land. ' 35 The owners of lower lands who wish to
develop must provide alternate means of carrying runoff from higher
properties at their own expense. 36 The emphasis upon natural
drainage puts even greater strictures upon upper landowners. Since
it is virtually impossible to grade, construct, or pave land without
modifying the natural quantity and paths of runoff, any development of upper land will necessarily violate the civil law prohibition
of interference with natural conditions. 37 Thus, developers of higher
lands will likely be held responsible for changes in runoff patterns.
In response to the perceived threat to unencumbered land
development that was posed by strict adherence to the civil law rule,
various states limited its application to rural land 38 or qualified the
doctrine with a rule of reason requiring courts "to determine the
rights of the parties with respect to the disposition of surface waters
by an assessment of all relevant factors.

' 39

As applied, the rule-of-

reason modification of the civil law doctrine had the following effect:
[The rule of reason] would . . .permit a landowner to obstruct

the flow of surface waters across his land by altering its contour,
although some harm would thereby be caused to the owner of the
dominant estate, provided "all the relevant factors" indicated
the owner of the servient estate behaved reasonably. Similarly,
although the civil law rule prohibits a landowner from gathering
surface waters and discharging them artificially in a concentrated flow, courts have permitted the owner of a dominant
estate to make some alterations, even though they caused the
Water Laws and Institutional Arrangements Background Rep. No. 2, 1976), reprinted
in Law of Ground Space Water in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REV. 11 (1976).
34. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 409, 412 P.2d 529, 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 281
(1966); see Hanks, supra note 27, at 688.
35. Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 72, 76 (1968).
36. Hanks, supra note 27, at 688. The same is true under the common enemy rule,
which gives lower owners the right to divert drainage from upper lands, but gives
them no recourse to recover the cost of diverting the runoff. Essentially the common
enemy rule leaves every man to himself in providing adequate drainage at his own
expense. See id. at 691. See also notes 139-151 and accompanying text infra.
37. See McMahon v. Thornton, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 495, 502 (1897).
38. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 26, at 931-32. Among those states was
Pennsylvania. See Rielly v. Stephenson, 222 Pa. 252, 70 A. 1097 (1908); Wilson v.
McCluskey, 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 594 (1911); McMahon v. Thornton, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 495,
502 (1897); Davidson v. Sanders, 1 Pa. Super Ct. 432 (1896).
39. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 403, 412 P.2d 529, 533, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277
(1966); see Hanks, supra note 27, at 688.
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water to flow in an unnatural manner, provided again "all the

40
relevant factors" showed reasonable conduct.

Thus, at least in some states, the application of the civil law rule has
become more flexible, although less predictable, due to the injection
of the rule-of-reason test. Natural conditions may be modified, but

the extent of liability due to alterations in drainage patterns depends
upon a retrospective, case-by-case judicial assessment of many
physical, hydrologic, economic, and other factors.
2.

The Common Enemy Rule

The common enemy rule is the antithesis of the civil law
doctrine. In substance, it holds that "a possessor of land has an
unlimited and unrestricted legal privilege to deal with the surface

water on his land as he pleases, regardless of the harm which he
may thereby cause to others." 41 An upper landowner may grade and

develop his property and thereby accelerate and collect runoff

"without being required to take into account the consequences to
other landowners, who have the right to protect themselves as best
they can." 42 In its extreme form, the common enemy rule is best
described as a neighborhood contest between pipes and dikes in

which "breach of the peace is often inevitable. '43
The origins of the common enemy doctrine are shrouded in

historical rhetoric. Although often termed the common law doctrine,
a number of legal commentators have seriously questioned whether

44
the common enemy rule is derived from English common law.
40. Hanks, supra 27, at 689; see Kinyon & McClure, supra note 26. at 904-05;
notes 52-54 and accompanying text infra.
41. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 26, at 898, citing Gannon v. Hargadon, 92
Mass. (10 Allen) 106, 109-10 (1865); see Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 400, 412 P.2d
529, 531, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275 (1966); Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75, 44 P. 113 (1896).
42. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 400, 412 P.2d 529, 531, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275
(1966).
43. Maloney & Plager, supra note 35, at 78.
44. See Dobbins, supra note 26, at 519; Kinyon & McClure, supra note 26, at
899-900; Thompson, Surface Waters, 23 AM. L. REV. 372, 391 (1889); Note, Water
Rights: Surface Waters: Similarity of Common Law and Civil Law, 8 CAL. L. REV.
197, 198 (1920); Note, Real Property: Drainage of Surface Waters, 3 CORNELL L.Q. 313,
315 (1918); Note, Surface Waters: The Rights of Abutting Property Owners, 15 VA. L.
REV. 288, 290 (1929); Note, 'Drainage of Surface Water by Upper Landowner onto
Adjoining Lower Land, 5 Wisc. L. REV. 239, 240 (1929). The term "common enemy" is
apparently derived from the English rule in shore erosion cases that the sea is the
common enemy. The New Jersey Supreme Court first used the term with respect to
diffused surface waters, possibly as a result of a misapprehension of English cases.
See Town of Union ads. Durkes, 38 N.J.L. 21 (1875); Dobbins, supra note 26, at 519 &
nn.11 & 12. The Texas Supreme Court has noted: "To say that surface waters ... are
a 'common enemy,' comparable to the constant ravages of the sea against its shore
line, would tax the credulity of a child." Miller v. Letzerick, 121 Tex. 248, 260-61, 49
S.W.2d 404, 411 (1932).
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Clearly, it is not universally accepted in the British Commonwealth
45
and American common law jurisdictions.
Some decisions have justified the common enemy doctrine upon
"a narrow and one-sided conception of the nature of land ownership. '46 Following the maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos (he who owns the surface owns to the sky and to
the depths), such opinions reason that each owner has an absolute
right to complete control of his own land, a right which "cannot be
interfered with or restrained by any considerations of injury to
others which may be occasioned by the flow of mere surface water in
consequence of the lawful appropriation of land by its owner to a
'47
particular use or mode of enjoyment.
Many courts have rationalized the adoption of the common
enemy rule on the ground that the doctrine favors land improvement
and economic expansion. 48 This public policy argument is based
upon the assumption that the civil law rule discourages construction
and development, but that the common enemy doctrine, by releasing
developers from liability for drainage, promotes investment and
construction. This assumption is open to serious question, however.
There is no evidence that the civil law rule has in fact impeded
urban development. The development in a number of urbanized
states, such as California, which follow the civil law doctrine
appears uninhibited by their drainage rules. 49 Drainage patterns,
and potential liability, are only one of many factors affecting the
decisions of land developers.5°
Moreover, the question of whether either rule tends to encourage
or discourage development depends upon the location of the land
involved. Consider the situation of three adjoining-landowners, A, B,
and C. Suppose A owns the highest tract, C the flat land, and B the
parcel in between. B grades his land, paves it, and constructs a
45. Some British Commonwealth countries have adopted the civil law rule, and
others the common enemy rule. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 26, at 901. American
courts are almost equally divided between the two doctrines. See id. at 896-97, 902-04.
See also 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 456.2.
46. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 26, at 898.
47. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106, 109-10 (1865); See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886), cited in Strauss v. City of
Allentown, 215 Pa. 96, 98, 63 A. 1073, 1073 (1906); Clouse v. Crow, 68 Pa. Super. Ct.
248, 252-53 (1917). See also R. WESTON & M. GANG, supra note 33, at 2-6, 14-16, 25-33
(discussing absolute ownership maxims and Sanderson rationale in groundwater
cases).
48. See, e.g., Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 148 (1881); Bowsky v. Speer, 31 N.J.L.
351, 352-53 (1865). See also Kinyon & McClure, supra note 26, at 898-99 & n.36;
Hanks, supra note 27, at 690-91.
49. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 406-07, 412 P.2d 529, 535, 50 Cal. Rptr.
273, 279 (1966).
50. See Hanks, supra note 27, at 691.
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residential subdivision. One commentator has analyzed B's alternatives as follows:
He can, under the common enemy rule, dump the surface waters
which will now collect in concentrated areas and flow at
increased velocity onto C. He saves the cost of constructing a
drainage system sufficient to prevent injury to C. But against
any savings realized by dumping surface waters onto C, B will
have to offset the cost of retaining walls and other devices to
protect himself against A. Even if B comes out with a net plus,
A's land may, by virtue of B's retaining structures, be turned
into a swamp, and C's land may be flooded and its soil carried
off. As to A and C, the common enemy rule surely does not
function to encourage development. .

.

. A similar analysis

shows that the civil law rule does not "hinder" development.
Under the common enemy rule, B has to make certain
expenditures to protect himself against unfriendly, but rulesanctioned, acts of A. These expenditures will likeJy be no less
than the cost to him, under the civil law rule, of conducting his
surface water so as not to increase his easement over C's tract.
As for C, the knowledge that B cannot substantially alter runoff
onto C's property can hardly be a deterrent [to development of
the flatland]. 5 1
Indeed, it should be noted that a major proportion-of Pennsylvania's industrial, commercial, and residential development has
occurred in the flatlands of river valleys, lands which are particularly vulnerable to increased flooding hazards engendered by
accelerated runoff from suburban development higher in the
watershed. The common enemy rule threatens rather than encourages these major urban land use investments. Even developers who
own the crest of hills can find little solace in the common enemy
doctrine when their downslope neighbors decide to build walls to
shut out the drainage from above.
3. Reasonable Use Rule
In response to the rigid and often irrational results of the civil
law and common enemy rules, many states expressly or implicitly
have adopted a "rule of reason" to govern drainage cases.52 The rule
51. Id.
52. Id. at 688; see 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 453; Maloney & Plager, supra
note 35, at 79-81. This drainage doctrine has been referred to as the "reasonable use"
rule, a term easily confused with the property law doctrine governing the allocation
and use of surface watercourses under the riparian doctrine. Hanks supra note 27, at
689-90. They are, however, different rules. The riparian "reasonable use" rule for
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of reason recognizes that the rights of each landowner are
interdependent, correlative, and valueless unless exercised with
reference to each other. The guiding light of the rule is the ancient
maxim of common law: "Use your own property in such manner as
not to injure that of another. ' 53 In jurisdictions following this rule,
three questions are fundamental to the reasonable use standard:
1. Was there a reasonable necessity for the actor to alter
the drainage to make use of his land?
2. Was the alteration done in a reasonable manner? That
is, was due care taken to prevent injury to another's land? Was
the natural drainage pattern followed as much as possible? Is
the artificial drainage system reasonably feasible?
3. Does the utility of the actor's conduct
reasonably
54
outweigh the gravity of the harm to others?
In applying the traditional nuisance balancing tests, the prime
attribute of the rule of reason is its flexibility in the search for a fair
resolution of each case. By sacrificing the absolutism of the original
civil law and common enemy approaches, the rule of reason tends to
encourage more careful and considerate action by individuals in the
planning and execution of land developments which may affect
drainage. Thus, the rule is more likely to reflect contemporary social,
environmental, and economic perspectives.
C.

Early Pennsylvania Cases -

The Bentz Doctrine

In the early Pennsylvania cases, the courts were involved in an
uncertain search for basic premises and principles, unable to rely
upon a body of judicial precedent or substantial scientific knowledge.
As subsequent litigation revealed the magnitude of the problems
associated with drainage rights, the rules announced in the early
water allocations is a property law concept for apportioning a resource. Id. at 690. The
drainage doctrine is a strong "admixture of tort law" which includes, as potential
issues in controversy, questions of foreseeability, contributory negligence, comparative negligence, assumption of risks, and proximate cause. Id. The term "rule of
reason" used in the New Jersey case of Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 330,
120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956), seems preferable nomenclature for the drainage rule in order to

avoid doctrinal confusion. For the purposes of this article, the terms "reasonable use"
or "rule of reason" will refer to the drainage law doctrines based upon the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of changes to drainage regimens.

53. 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 453.1, citing Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co.,
43 N.H. 569, 577 (1862).
54. 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 453.3 (footnotes omitted); see Weinberg v.
Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963); Klutey v. Commonwealth,

Dep't of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967); Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163,
32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 826 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
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cases were found to be ineffective in dealing with drainage disputes.
Consequently, the early rules have often been distinguished,
modified, or abandoned in later decisions.
The first significant drainage decision was rendered by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1844 in Bentz v. Armstrong.55 The
plaintiff, a Philadelphia landowner, asserted a right to divert the
storm runoff and the flow from a spring located on his property to
the land of his neighbor, the defendant. 56 The defendant placed an
obstruction on his own land to throw the waters back upon the
plaintiff's lot. 57 The court found that the plaintiff had not acquired

an "easement" to divert the water onto the defendant's land, and,
therefore, could not demand removal of the defendant's protective
obstruction. 58 The result could have been rationalized under the
common enemy rule, 59 but that was not the apparent basis of the
decision. Although the Bentz court rejected the natural flow concept
of the civil law rule,60 it did not embrace the absolute ownership
premise of the common enemy doctrine. The court stated:
[I]n the purchase of lots of ground laid out and sold for the
purpose of building up towns or cities thereon, it has even been
understood, and such has been the practice and usage too, that
the natural formation of the surface will, and indeed must,
necessarily undergo a change in the construction of buildings
and other improvements that are designed and intended to be
made. In doing this, it would seem to be right that the common
benefit and convenience of the respective owners of adjoining
lots should be consulted and attended to; but certainly no one
ought to be restrained from improving his lot in such a manner
as to make it answer the purpose for which it was laid out, sold
and purchased, if practicable without overreaching upon his
neighbour's lot. He ought to be permitted to form and regulate
the surface of it as he pleases, either by excavating or filling up,
as may be requisite to the convenient enjoyment of it; taking
care, however, not to produce any detriment or injury to his
61
neighbour in the occupation or enjoyment of his adjoining lot.

In essence, the Bentz decision follows the common law principle
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a
manner as not to injure that of another). The foundation of the Bentz
55. 8 Watts & Serg. 40 (Pa. 1844).
56. Id. at 41.

57. Id.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 41-42.
See notes 41-54 and accompanying text supra.
8 Watts & Serg. at 41.
Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
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rule was the concept that while landowners have the right to make
reasonable improvements on their property, they are also obligated
62
to take reasonable care to avoid injury to others.
By its own terms, the Bentz rule was applicable to urban
drainage controversies. A dichotomy arose between urban centers
and rural areas as the natural flow rule, which came to be adopted
for rural drainage cases, was found impractical for developing urban
lands. 63 Therefore, the Bentz doctrine led to the creation of a
different principle for urban areas that allowed reasonable modification of natural conditions in the course of urban development, while
imposing an obligation upon those who changed the land to provide
64
adequate means of drainage in order to protect their neighbor.
The Bentz rule was followed in the urban drainage cases decided
between 1844 and 1908. The defendant in Young v. Leedam,6 5 like
the defendant in Bentz, had attempted to block drainage coming
from the plaintiffs higher urban land.6 6 As in Bentz, the issue was
whether the plaintiff had a right or easement to drain water
naturally onto defendant's lot. 67 Although the court cited Bentz in

absolving the defendant of liability, the question of the upper
landowner's duty to provide adequate drainage so as to avoid
damage to others was not directly confronted. 6 The duty of an
urban property owner to connect to a drainage sewer was discussed
in Sentner v. Tees, 69 apparently for the first time since Bentz. In
Sentner, it was claimed that water accumulating on defendant's
70
unimproved land in Philadelphia had invaded the plaintiffs cellar.
The court specifically limited the rule requiring the installation of

62. Id. In describing the bounds of what it considered to be the requisite
reasonable care regarding drainage, the court stated:

It is of great importance that the water from each lot, arising from rain or other
cause, should be conducted by the owner or occupier thereof, if he wishes to have
it removed, directly from it to a sewer or other place appropriated for the receipt
and discharge of the same, and not be turned or led on to an adjoining lot . . .;
and it appears. . . to be the duty of the owner of each lot, if he improves it, to do it
in such way, if practicable, as to lead and conduct the water that happens to fall
upon it, off in the way mentioned.
Id.
63. See notes 27-40 and accompanying text supra; notes 79-102 and accompanying text infra.
64. The Bentz rule is remarkably similar to the so-called modern "reasonable use
rule," which was later developed largely as a response to the perceived inadequacies
of the natural flow and common enemy doctrines. See 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12,
§ 453.1.
65. 67 Pa. 351 (1871).
66. Id. at 352.
67. Id. at 354.
68. See id. at 355.
69. 132 Pa. 216, 18 A. 1114 (1890).
70. Id.at 216, 18 A. at 1114.
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adequate drainage systems to cases where the landowner charged
had developed his property, thus no liability could be imposed upon
the defendant for failure to provide drainage for his unimproved
71
parcel.
The Bentz rule reached its fullest development in two Pennsylvania Superior Court cases decided in 1896 and 1897. In both Davidson
v. Sanders72 and McMahon v. Thornton7 3 the defendants had graded
and developed land in an urban area, thereby concentrating and
accelerating water runoff onto a neighboring property. 4 In Davidson, the court relied upon the dicta in Bentz and found the grading
plan and its resultant flooding to be negligent. 75 In McMahon, the
court articulated the applicable test as follows:
[The defendant] must in such alteration of the land, when
changing it from the face that nature has put upon it to conform
to his own idea of that which is desirable, take care of all the
water that falls or flows upon the land and conduct it off the new
surface adapted to his own fancy in76such a way as will cause no
injury to the adjoining tenements.
The McMahon court also commented upon the status of the Bentz
doctrine:
[The doctrine has] stood without qualification or limitation for
over fifty years. It seems to have been so universally accepted as
a correct exposition of law, that the Supreme Court has in no
case since that time been called upon to reconsider the question
of the right to recover by one lot owner in the city or town for
injury to his property by an adjoining property owner who has
the flowing of surface or rain
built upon and improved his lot, by
77
water from the one to the other.

The universal acceptance of Bentz was, however, short-lived.
Within a decade after Davidson and McMahon the reasonable care
rule for urban areas was replaced by the maxims and policies of the
78
common enemy rule.

71. Id. at 217, 18 A. at 1114.
72. 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 432 (1896).
73. 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 495 (1897).
74. Id. at 497; 1 Pa. Super. Ct. at 433.
75. 1 Pa. Super. Ct. at 438.
76. 5 Pa. Super. Ct. at 503.
77. Id. at 502, quoting Davidson v. Sanders, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 437 (1896).
78. See Rielly v. Stephenson, 222 Pa. 252, 70 A. 1097 (1908). For a discussion of
the development of the urban common enemy rule, see notes 139-193 and
accompanying text infra.
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D. Development of the Civil Law Rule in Rural Areas
A few years after Bentz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
squarely addressed the problems of rural drainage law. In Martin v.
Riddle,79 a cemetery company collected the water falling upon its
hillside parcel and discharged it upon the defendant's land. s8 The
defendant, in turn, obstructed the water and caused the runoff to
discharge onto a public road, from which it flowed onto neighboring
lots causing injury to the plaintiff.8 1 Finding a paucity of Pennsylvania precedent on the subject, the court turned to "books of a foreign
origin" 82 - primarily civil law materials - to resolve the problem.
The court stated the classic formulation of the civil law's natural
flow principle as follows:
Where two fields adjoin, and one is lower than the other, the
lower must necessarily be subject to all the natural flow of water
from the upper one. The inconvenience arises from its position,
and is usually more than compensated by other circumstances.
Hence the owner of the lower ground has no right to erect
embankments whereby the natural flow of the water from the
upper ground shall be stopped; nor has the owner of the upper
ground a right to make any excavations or drains by which the
flow of water is directed from its natural channel, and a new
channel made on the lower ground; nor can he collect into one
channel waters usually flowing off into his neighbour's fields by
several channels, and thus increase the wash upon the lower
83
fields.
The justices suggested that an agricultural property owner could
cover up and conceal drains "keeping the place of discharge
unchanged."8 Further dicta implied that an owner might even "use
proper means" in draining moist land and discharge the water
"according to the natural channel, even though the flow of water
8 5
upon his neighbor might be thereby somewhat increased."
However, no owner could - as was attempted by the cemetery
company - direct to a single point formerly diffused runoff and
discharge it upon another's land.8 6 Thus, the defendant was found to
79. 26 Pa. 415 (1856) (summary affirmance accompanying case of Kauffman v.
Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407 (1856)).
80. 26 Pa. at 415.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 416.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 417.
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have a right to block the unlawful discharge "[i]f he could stop it
without injury to any but the cemetery company. 8' 7 He could not,
however, obstruct the flow by turning it upon the road to harm
88
others.
The court further expounded upon the civil law rule in Kauffman
v. Griesemer.8 9 There the complaining upper landowner alleged that
the defendant, who owned lower adjacent lands, had unlawfully
blocked a natural drainway by means of a sod dam 0 It was found,
however, that the plaintiff had installed a ditch to drain a spring or
pond on his land, causing the water to flow onto the defendant's
parcel. 91 Prior to the installation of the ditch, waters from the
plaintiffs pond and surrounding areas had flowed onto the
neighboring lands only in times of freshet or flood. 92 Kauffman
recognized as the basis of the natural flow the maxim aqua currit et
debit currere (water runs, and ought to run, as it has used to run). 93
The court rejected the restrictive construction of the natural flow
standard propounded by contemporary decisions in other states,
such as New Jersey, which held that no upper landowner, under any
circumstances, could cause a greater quantity of water than that
which would naturally flow over the land of another. 94 Such a rule,
the justices concluded, would force a proprietor to abandon the
land "to perpetual sterility, or never vary the course of cultivation,
simply because such acts would produce some change in the manner
of discharging the water. ' 95 The court noted that certain activities,
such as those in Martin,96 which increase water running off through
natural drainageways might be allowed, but runoff changes would
not be permitted if the increased volume could not be discharged
through natural channels and outlets. 97 Moreover, the decision
indicated that no owner would have a right to dig an artificial
channel to drain waters onto neighbouring properties when that
water would not have ordinarily flowed there. 98 Because the plaintiff
in Kauffman had attempted artificially to drain pond waters that
would have reached the defendant's land only in freshets, the court
87. Id.

88. Id.
89. 26 Pa. 407 (1856).

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 408.
Id. at 411-12.
Id.
Id. at 413.

Id. at 414, citing Merrit v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460 (1795).
26 Pa. at 413.
See notes 79-88 and accompanying text supra.
26 Pa. at 414.
Id.
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ruled that the defendant had a right to build a dam to throw back
this unlawful inundation. 99
Although the general principles which guide Pennsylvania's
application of the civil law doctrine were articulated in Martin and
Kauffman, they left many important questions unanswered. At what
point might "use of proper means" in draining land become
unlawful collection, diversion, and discharge of diffused waters? 10°
What constitutes a "natural channel" 10 ' which is subject to the
servitude of drainage by upper lands? 02 To what extent can an
upper landowner increase or accelerate the flow of diffused water or
water in a natural drainage channel without incurring liability?
1. Collection and Diversion
The clearest case of unlawful collection and diversion is the
installation of an artificial drain to discharge marsh or spring
waters that previously "only saturated the earth without running off
by a defined channel.' ' 0 3 Similarly prohibited is the construction of
a ditch to divert waters from their natural course and to discharge
the diverted runoff at a point where the waters would not naturally
flow.

10 4

Another example of an unlawful collection and diversion is

found in In re Limerick & Colebrookedate Turnpike Co.'0 5 In order to
drain water from a highway, the Limerick road company had
constructed a culvert with three outlets, one of which was on the
defendant's land. 10 6 The company allowed the defendant's neighbors
to obstruct the two outlets on their land, forcing all of the drainage
through defendant's property. 10 7 The defendant was held to have a
08
self-help right to dam off the "extraordinary flood."'
0
9
The case of Meixell v. Morgan' indicated that the prototypal
violation of the collection and diversion rule occurs when the upper,
or dominant, landowner gathers together diffused surface waters
that would otherwise have flowed in many directions and discharges
99. Id. at 414-15.
100. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
102. It should be noted that the term "natural channel" as used in the civil law
doctrine to define the drainage paths which are subject to the servitude is not
necessarily identical or even analogous to the common enemy rule concept of
"watercourse" or "channel," which delineates an exception to the common enemy
doctrine. See notes 152-160 and accompanying text infra.
103. Miller v. Laubach, 47 Pa. 154, 155 (1864).
104. See Hays v. Hinkleman, 68 Pa. 324 (1871).
105. 80 Pa. 425 (1876).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 426.
108. Id. at 426-27.
109. 149 Pa. 415, 24 A. 216 (1892).
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them at a point where they did not previously flow. In Meixell, the
defendant, who was the owner of the upper property, had installed
tile drains to aid the cultivation of his land. 110 The water collected in
the tile drains was discharged into a ditch which ran through the
plaintiffs farm."' The lower court ruled that the defendant had a
right to lay the artificial drains to carry off ordinary rainfall and
discharge it at one point if: 1) the point of discharge was the natural
watershed for both tracts of land; 2) the waters on the upper land
would naturally have drained through the ditch which flowed
through the lower land; and 3) the drainage scheme installed by the
upper landowner did not materially increase the flow over the lower
land to the plaintiffs injury. 112 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed, noting, however, as to the third point, that some increase
in flow would be allowed as long as care 3was taken not to cause
"unnecessary injury" to the lower owner."
Thus, the gravamen of the collection and diversion test is the
change in the natural point of discharge. If the waters would have
flowed over the lower land in a diffused condition, they may not be
artificially collected into a single channel; but if they naturally flow
through the lower land in a drainage channel, the upper owner may
install artificial drains to collect the surface water and discharge
them into that natural channel, releasing them to flow as they would
have naturally.
2. Drainage Courses Subject to a Servitude
The rule in Martin is stated alternatively. The lower parcel of
land is subject to the "natural flow of water" from the upper
property." 4 Conversely, the owner of the upper ground has no right
"to make any excavations or drains by which the flow of water is
directed from its natural channel; nor can he collect into one channel
waters usually flowing off into his neighbour's fields by several
channels .... ,,1"5 The use of the terms "natural flow" and "natural
channel" in Martin and subsequent decisions may have created
some ambiguity. Often the term "natural channel" or "natural
drainage course" is confused with definitions of a "watercourse" or
"stream" derived from other contexts." 6 For purposes of drainage, a
"natural drainage course" is not necessarily limited to a stream
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 417, 24 A. at 216.
Id. at 418, 24 A. at 216; see notes 128-152 and accompanying text infra.

114. See notes 79-83 and accompanying text supra.
115. 26 Pa. at 416; see note 83 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 13-25 and accompanying text supra.
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having a defined bed and banks to which riparian rights may
attach. 117 Indeed, definitions of "natural flow" or "channel" which
are used when applying the civil law rule may be quite different from
those found in the natural channel exception to the common enemy
rule. 118 As used in the civil law context, the term "channel" is a
misnomer. The civil law drainage rule mandates maintenance of the
natural flow of diffused surface water, and not merely preservation
of water in streams or drainage, courses. Consequently, the natural
flow doctrine prohibits a change in the direction or discharge points
of all surface runoff.
. A few cases may be illustrative. In Hays v. Hinkleman,119 the
plaintiff complained that the defendant had diverted the natural
runoff and caused it to flow through his field. 120 The natural course
of drainage from the defendant's property, which swelled to a
considerable stream each spring, appeared to be by way of a hollow
or ravine. 121 The court's factual statement suggested that this
"stream" flowed only in times of spring freshets. 122 Under traditional definitions of a watercourse, this hollow or ravine with only
freshet flow would hardly qualify as a stream for riparian doctrine
purposes. 123 Yet, applying the civil law rule, the justices found that
the defendant had altered the natural course of the water and cast it
upon the plaintiffs land. 2 4 The ground for the ruling was not the
diversion of a stream, but the diversion of the natural flow and
direction of drainage. 12 5 A more accurate terminology was used in
Rhoads v. Davidheiser.126 The test, according to the Rhoads court, is
whether the person charged had diverted "water from the course
which nature ... provided for it ... to the injury of the lower field
"127

Thus, under the natural flow/civil law rule, the servitude
attaches to the natural mode of runoff, whether in a diffused state or
in defined channels. The obstruction or diversion of diffused or
117. See id.
118. For a discussion of this exception, see notes 152-160 and accompanying text
infra.
119. 68 Pa. 324 (1871).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 326.
122. See id.
123. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
124. 68 Pa. at 326.
125. See id; accord, Huddleston v. Borough of West Bellevue, 111 Pa. 110, 122, 2 A.
200, 203 (1885) (borough found liable for construction of gutter which bypassed
natural depressions or ravines through which runoff had formerly flowed).
126. 133 Pa. 226, 19 A. 400 (1890).
127. Id. at 233, 19 A. at 401, quoting E. WASHBURN, ON EASEMENTS 450 (3d ed.
1873).
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defined runoff is actionable, and the existence of a defined channel
or watercourse is irrelevant to the civil law doctrine.
3. Acceleration of Natural Flow
Martin and Kauffman suggested that rural landowners could
reasonably increase the flow onto lower lands by means of drainage
128
systems as long as the place of discharge was unchanged.
However, the following question remains: How much of an increase
is reasonable?
The starting point of the civil law test is natural flow.129 The two
clearest violations of that standard are 1) concentrating the
discharge of diffused waters at a particular point,"3° and 2)
increasing the area of the land drained by means of grading or
installation of storm sewers.' 3 ' Thus, Magee v. Pennsylvania
Schuylkill Valley R.R. 132 held that an upper proprietor could not
install a pipe to discharge onto his lower neighbor's land water from
adjacent properties that would have been naturally absorbed on his
land. 33 The court noted that this prohibition would apply "even
though no additional water [would run] from the pipe than [that]
quantity which would have been absorbed" on the upper owner's
3
parcel. 4
The position adopted in Magee seems to suggest that if water
would be absorbed naturally on the upper land, it may not be
conducted off the land by artificial means. Such a reading of Magee
might lead to the conclusion that the installation of drains or any
impervious surfaces would be precluded because such alterations, by
their nature, intercept some waters that would otherwise percolate
into the ground. This broad interpretation is not, however, the
Pennsylvania rule. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated:
"[F]or the sake of agriculture, a man may drain his ground
which is too moist, and discharging the water according to its
natural channel, may cover up and conceal the drains through
his lands; . . . and may clear out impediments in the natural
channel of his streams, though the flow of water on his
neighbor's land be thereby increased ....
",135

128. See notes 79-99 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
130. See notes 103-113 and accompanying text supra.
131. See Frederick v. Lansdale Borough, 156 Pa. 613, 27 A. 563 (1893).
132. 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 187 (1900).
133. Id. at 196-97.
134. Id. at 196.
135. Meixell v. Morgan, 149 Pa. 415, 418, 24 A. 216, 216 (1892), quoting Kauffman
v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407, 413-14 (1856).
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The court has recognized that the "very act of draining land
necessarily increases the flow of water. ' 136 The test is not whether
the drainage, grading, or development of land measurably accelerates runoff, but whether care has been taken "not to cause
unnecessary injury to the owner of the servient tenement."' 137 If an
upper landowner's actions significantly increase the amount of
water discharged in the natural drainage path, then reasonable care
38
must be exercised to avoid injury to lower proprietors.
E. Development of the Common Enemy Approach in Urban Areas
While the interstices of the civil law rule were explored by the
Pennsylvania courts, cases in other fields laid the foundation for the
acceptance of the common enemy rule. Most notably, in 1886, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced its remarkable decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson,'39 holding that a mining
company had an absolute right to pump acid-polluted water into a
stream as part of the "natural" use of its land. 40 The Sanderson
rationale, upon which was built many of the more notorious lines of
water law doctrine,' 4 ' was succinctly stated: "[E]very man is entitled
to the ordinary and natural use and enjoyment of his property
"'142

The court applied this principle in 1906 in Strauss v. City of
Allentown 143 to underpin what would become the common enemy
rule for urban areas. In Strauss, the owner of a mill bordering the
city limits, complained that urban development had prevented
natural absorption of the water and had greatly accelerated water
runoff, causing extensive erosion and debris damage. 144 The Court
relied upon each landowner's "right to the natural, proper and
profitable use of his own land" to rule that, absent negligence, an
unavoidable loss imposed upon proprietors by the "ordinary and
145
regular course of expansion of the city" is not actionable.

136. 149 Pa. at 418, 24 A. at 216 (1892).
137. Id.
138. See Elliott v. Oil City, 129 Pa. 570, 18 A. 553 (1889) (plaintiff recovered where
city installed larger culvert through road, allowing increased runoff from developing
area to discharge through natural ravine, damaging house).
139. 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
140. Id. at 151, 6 A. at 460.
141. See R. WESTON & M. GANG, supra note 33, at 25-32.
142. 113 Pa. at 145, 6 A. at 456. It is interesting to note that in the process of
explaining this statement, the court explicitly recognized the natural flow rule. Id.
143. 215 Pa. 96, 63 A. 1073 (1906).
144. Id. at 97, 63 A. at 1073.
145. Id. at 98, 63 A. at 1073.
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Full statement of the rule came only two years later, as the court
abandoned the Bentz doctrine 146 in favor of a common enemy
approach. By increasing the grade of a lot on a hillside, the
defendant in Rielly v. Stephenson147 caused diffused water which
formerly flowed over his property to discharge onto his neighbor's
land. 148 The court noted that the discharge was the natural and
inevitable consequence of the defendant's improvement of his lot
and that no claim of negligent execution of the project by the
defendant was asserted.' 49 In upholding the legitimacy of the
defendant's actions, the court stated:
The owners of lots in cities and towns buy and own with the
manifest condition that the natural or existing surface is liable
to be changed by the progress of municipal development. All
such owners have equal rights neither lessened nor increased by
priority of improvement, and the primary right of each owner is
to protect himself and his lot from loss or inconvenience from
the flow of surface water. The owner at the foot of the slope is
under no obligation to allow his lot to continue as a reservoir for
the surplus water of the neighborhood. He may shut it out by
grading or otherwise and the fact that thereby he may
incidentally increase the flow on the adjoining lot, neither
makes him answerable in damages nor affects the adjoining
owner's right in his turn to shut out the original, plus the
increased flow on his lot. The owner cannot be coerced as to time
or manner of improvement by risk of having put upon him the
burden of providing for the flow upon others. 1 °
Despite this broad pronouncement of the urban property owners'
rights, the Rielly court emphasized that these rights are not
absolute:
[The urban property owner] may not proceed negligently so as to
do unnecessary damage to others. But so far as he acts upon his
right to protect his enjoyment of his own property, any
incidental loss to his neighbor is damnum absque injuria. It is
clearly settled, however, first, that he may not obstruct a natural
channel for the flow of the water, or a channel that has acquired
the character of an easement; and, secondly, he may not gather
surface water into a body and discharge it on the adjoining land.
146.
supra.
147.
148.
149.
150.

For a discussion of the Bentz doctrine, see notes 55-77 and accompanying text
222 Pa. 252, 70 A. 1097 (1908).
Id. at 254, 70 A. at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 256, 70 A. at 1099.
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His right is to shut out the invading water, as a common enemy,
for the protection of his own land. 15 1
The Rielly doctrine, while comprehensively framed, left several
issues open to further litigation. What constitutes a "natural
channel" which cannot be obstructed? Under what circumstances
can the improvement of property be found to be "negligent,"
resulting in "unnecessary damage" to other lands? To what extent
may an owner install artificial drains before becoming accountable
for "gathering the water into a body?"
1. The Natural Channel Exception
The common enemy doctrine announced in Rielly applies only to
diffused surface water. No property owner has the right to obstruct
natural watercourses or channels which have gained the status of an
easement by prescription. 152 Only waters flowing over the land in a
diffuse condition may be diverted, obstructed, or artificially collected
without liability.
The concept of a "natural channel" for purposes of this
exception to the common enemy rule appears to be more restricted
than the natural channel definition applicable under the civil law
doctrine. 153 Under the common enemy rule, the meaning of the terms
"watercourse" and "natural channel" is confined to "a stream of
water usually flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and sides
or banks. ' 154 Essentially, the obstruction exception is limited to
streams and brooks which are subject to riparian rights. 155 The
exception may, however, extend to artificial channels which, due to
long existence and continued use, have acquired the status of an
56
easement by prescription. For example, in Rohrer v. Harrisburg,
the city was charged with blocking drainage in a ditch located along
a portion of road annexed by the municipality. 157 The ditch had
existed for over thirty years and had "at least the weight of long
continued sanction of local officials in deciding what was necessary
to preserve the highways."'' 58 It was held that the ditch, although
not a natural watercourse, had acquired the status of "the natural
151. Id. at 256-57, 70 A. at 1099.
152. Id.
153. For a discussion of the natural channel definition of the civil law doctrine, see
notes 114-127 and accompanying text supra.
154. Kunkle v. Ford City Borough, 305 Pa. 416, 420, 158 A. 159, 160 (1931); quoting
28 AM. & ENG. ENCYC. OF L. 944 (C. Williams ed. 1895).

155.
156.
157.
158.

See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
20 Pa. Super. Ct. 543 (1902).
Id. at 546.
Id. at 548.
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course of water," that is, the character of a drainage easement. 15 9
Therefore, the court upheld the jury's finding that the city was liable
for negligently obstructing the ditch, and throwing waters upon the
lands of adjacent private owners. 160
2. Liability for Negligent Improvement Causing Unnecessary
Damage
The extent of a landowner's right to collect and divert surface
drainage in the course of development was not fully settled by
Rielly.16 1 Clearly, no automatic liability arises from modification of
62
natural drainage. As stated in Wilson v. McCluskey:
[T]he owner of a lot in a city or town, in grading and improving
the lot may shut out the surface flow upon his lot without any
obligation on his part to prevent it from flowing over the
adjacent land, or to lead it by artificial or other means to a sewer
or other avenue of escape ....163
However, in modifying the natural drainage, the owner may not
64
proceed negligently to the detriment of other landowners.
Negligence is generally defined as the failure to exercise ordinary,
due, or reasonable care in the performance of an activity. 16 5 In the
area of drainage, under the Rielly rationale, land owners would seem
to be compelled to use reasonable care in improving their properties
in order to avoid unnecessary damage to neighboring lands.
However, the judicial interpretation given the negligence standard
has been more restricted.
The Rielly rule did not impose liability merely because the
damages inflicted upon neighboring lands by drainage changes
159. Id.

160. Id. But see Lorah v. Amity Township, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 529 (1908) (court
rejected claim of prescriptive easement in roadside ditch and held that adjacent
owners had no right adverse to township when owners had used the ditch for
drainage over a 30-year period).
161. See notes 147-152 and accompanying text supra.
162. 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 594 (1911).
163. Id. at 597.
164. Id.; Tess v. Charleroi Home Bldg. Co., 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 505 (1929); White v.
Philadelphia & Reading R.R., 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 372 (1911).
165. W. PROSSER, supra note 54, §§30-31; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 282-283, 298 (1965). It should be noted that in the area of drainage rights - as
contrasted with, for example, groundwater problems - the issue of foreseeability is
rarely raised. Compare Zimmerman v. Union Paving Co., 135 Pa. Super. Ct. 373, 4
A.2d 319 (1938), and Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855), with Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165
Pa. 267, 30 A. 844 (1895), and Wilson v. McCluskey, 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 594 (1911). The
potential damage to lower lands caused by changing drainage paths is usually
evident from the surface contours of the land. Gravity and common experience leave
little to speculation.
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could have been avoided by an inexpensive modification of the
improvement plan. 166 The standard is "not simply whether the
increased flow was preventable, by the defendants improving their
lot in some other manner.' ' 167 Generally, the owner is free to choose
the "time and manner of improvement" unhindered by considerations of the flow of drainage upon others. 168 However, if, having
selected a development plan, the proprietor causes unnecessary
damage to others through negligent implementation of the plan,
liability may be imposed.'

69

Perhaps the most extensive explanation of the negligence test in
drainage matters was presented in Pfeiffer v. Brown,170 a case
that preceded Rielly but recognized the same basic rules. In Pfeiffer,
the defendant had drilled an oil well that pumped out salt water in
the process of extracting crude petroleum. 171 In response to the
defendant's release of the salt water onto the plaintiffs land, the
plaintiff constructed a channel to carry away the saline water and
then sued for costs and damages. 172 Although recognizing that the
defendant had a right under Sanderson to the "natural use and
enjoyment of his own land,"'' 3 the court posited:
[T]he use which inflicts the damage must be natural, proper, and
free from negligence, and the damage unavoidable ....

Hence

the practical inquiry is, first, whether the damage was necessary
and unavoidable; secondly, if not, was it sufficiently obvious to
have been foreseen, and also preventable by reasonable care and
7 4
expenditure?'
Thus, liability may be imposed if, by the exercise of reasonable
judgment or investigation, a landowner could have known that
injury to others would result from an activity, and the expenditure of
a reasonable amount of money might have prevented the damage.
The Pfeiffer court concluded that the defendant should have foreseen
the results of indiscriminate release of the salt water, and that the
166. See 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 594 (1911).
167. Id. at 599.
168. 222 Pa. 252, 256, 70 A. 1097, 1099 (1908).
169. The basis of liability for individual proprietors is derived from the rule
imposing liability on municipalities for the negligent design and implementation of
community improvements and storm drainage plans. See notes 325-378 and
accompanying text infra.
170. 165 Pa. 267, 30 A. 844 (1895).
171. Id. at 273, 30 A. at 845.
172. Id. at 268.
173. Id. at 273, 30 A. at 845, citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa.
126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
174. 165 Pa. at 273, 30 A. at 845, quoting Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131
Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012 (1890).
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simple device of channeling it away from the plaintiffs property was
17 5
an obvious means of avoiding the damage.
The central question is whether the damage caused by lawful
improvement of land is avoidable or unnecessary. In this regard, the
court in Pfeiffer announced several general principles that would
appear to be of continuing validity today:
It is not to be lost sight of that the defendant's right to injure
another's land at all, to any extent, is an exception, and the
burden is always upon him to bring himself within it. And his
exception is founded on necessity and because otherwise he
would himself be deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of
his own land.. . . If the expense of preventing the damage from
his act is such as practically to counterbalance the expected
profit or benefit, then it is clearly unreasonable, and beyond
what he could justly be called upon to assume. If on the other
hand, however large in actual amount, it is small in proportion
to the gain to himself, it is reasonable in regard to his neighbor's
rights, and he should pay it to prevent the damage, or should
make compensation for the injury done. Between these two
extremes lies a debatable region where the cases must stand
17 6
upon their own facts.
If the damage could have been prevented short of "detracting from
the purpose and benefit of the contemplated act" and depriving the
defendant of the use of his own property, the defendant will be held
1 77
liable.
3.

Collection and Diversion of Storm Water

Both Strauss and Rielly recognized a limit to the common enemy
doctrine.'7 8 The court in Rielly warned that no landowner or
municipality would be allowed to "gather surface water into a body
and discharge it on the adjoining land."' 79 Accordingly, the bounds
of the common enemy rule would be exceeded if a proprietor, through
the use of an artificial channel, concentrated and discharged what
would otherwise be surface water at a particular point on the
servient land in greater volume than would normally flow thereon.1 80
175. 165 Pa. at 273-74, 30 A. at 845.
176. Id. at 274, 30 A. at 845.
177. Id. It should be noted that the superior court in Wilson v. McCluskey, 46 Pa.
Super. Ct. 594 (1911), apparently disregarded these principles, which were embodied in
the lower court's jury charge. See notes 162-165 and accompanying text supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 145 & 151 supra.
179. 222 Pa. at 257, 70 A. at 1099.
180. See 215 Pa. at 98.-99, 63 A. at 1073.
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This distinction appears to be drawn from earlier civil rule cases,181
and injects an element of the "natural flow" criteria into the
common enemy theory. Thus, in Torrey v. City of Scranton, 8 2 the
supreme court ruled that, while a municipality would not be liable
for flooding of private property caused by inadequate gutters,
drains, culverts, or sewers, it could not "throw a body of water upon
the property of one of its citizens which would not naturally have
flowed there."''8 3 This broad statement hardly comports with the
general understanding of the common enemy rule.'"4 If read to
incorporate the natural flow tests derived in civil law cases, it would
bar any change of grade or natural drainage which might modify
the direction of water flow. The traditional deference accorded to
owners in the development of their land'8 5 would be reversed.
The collection and diversion exception to the common enemy
doctrine is far narrower in application. The test is not merely
whether the direction of flow has been changed. Rather the
gravamen of the exception is the accumulation of a volume and force
of water, 8 6 which by means of artificial channels is cast upon
neighboring lands.'8 7 The deliberate channeling of runoff onto other
properties, in a manner which causes foreseeable harm, cannot be
condoned within the rationale of the common enemy rule. This point
was underscored in Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. v. Pittston Coal
Mining Co.' 88 Lehigh involved a drainage dispute between two
adjoining mine owners.' 8 9 It appeared that the defendant had
collected mine water in a tunnel and ditch and discharged it among
broken rocks at the terminus of the tunnel from whence it percolated
into the plaintiff's mine.'9 On the basis of Sanderson,the defendant
argued that the "time honored maxim, [s]ic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas" (Use your property in such manner as not to injure that of
another) was inapplicable to coal mining in Pennsylvania.' 9' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court flatly rejected this proposition, stating:
The right to use land for agricultural or mining purposes in
the usual and proper manner, although it may result in some
181. See, e.g., Miller v. Laubach, 47 Pa. 154 (1864). For a discussion of the civil law
rule of collection and diversion, see notes 103-113 and accompanying text supra.
182. 133 Pa. 173, 19 A. 351 (1890).
183. Id. at 180, 19 A. at 351.
184. See Hanks, supra note 27, at 694.
185. See notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
186. See Hanks, supra note 27, at 695, 697.
187. See Morton v. Dormont Borough, 334 Pa. 283, 5 A.2d 803 (1939); Lehigh &
Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 289 Pa. 492, 137 A. 672 (1927).
188. 289 Pa. 492, 137 A. 672 (1927).
189. Id. at 494, 137 A. at 672.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 496, 137 A. at 673 (emphasis in original).
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additional flow of surface water upon the land of an adjoining
owner, is undoubted, but the right to collect such water and
conduct it upon another's land'through an artificial channel
cannot be sustained. While proper farming or mining may affect
the flow of surface water, yet, when it departs it must be in a
natural course and not collected, together and cast upon lower
1
land by artificial means.

92

Indeed, the court found that grading the ditch toward plaintiffs
land, rather than pumping the water to the surface or draining the
water into a sump, established "defendant's intent to rid itself of
' 1 93
surplus water at plaintiffs expense."
F. Modification and Refinement of Drainage Rules Challenge of Large-Scale Developments

The

By the third decade of the twentieth century the broad elements
of Pennsylvania drainage law had been established. In the ensuing
fifty years, they have been refined, modified, criticized, distinguished, and otherwise contorted to meet the intensifying problems
of storm water management and drainage impacts of large-scale
development. Several interrelated issues have become increasingly
troublesome: 1) whether the distinction between urban and rural
land is rational or practical; 2) the selection of the appropriate set of
rules to apply to development in formerly rural, suburbanizing areas;
and 3) whether traditional drainage rules serve the public interest
and provide justice in the case of major developments.
Tess v. Charleroi Home Building Co.' 94 raised several of these

issues. In Tess, the plaintiff owned a home at the lower end of a
hillside, and the defendant developer possessed an upper parcel of
195
land that had been used as a pasture prior to being subdivided.
Concrete streets and sidewalks were installed on fill, and although
the grading of the subdivision and the deposits of shale and clay to
support the streets reduced the land area draining toward the
plaintiff, the defendant's removal of the sod and placement of the fill
caused surface runoff to carry sediment and debris onto the lower
lots.'

96

Despite the prior rural use of defendant's subdivision, the

superior court ruled the area to be "urban" land; accordingly, the
court applied the common enemy rule to hold that, absent
192. Id. at 497, 137 A. at 673.
193. Id. at 497-98, 137 A. at 673 (emphasis added).
194. 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 505 (1929).
195. Id. at 507.

196. Id.
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negligence, the developer was not liable for the deposit of dirt, soil, or
off-scourings onto lower neighbors. 197 Thus, the defendant had a
right to alter the water drainage as part of "the natural, proper, and
profitable use of his own land."' 198
The degree of negligence required to impose liability on a
developer was severe under the early cases. Rejecting the argument
that, since the "average man" has little knowledge of geological or
mechanical principles, a developer is not liable for a fill that causes
a landslide onto neighboring property, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that negligence could be established when a developer
who had been previously warned by the injured parties of the danger
failed to take proper precautions. 199 Absent such blatant disregard of
a clear warning, courts were reluctant to find negligence in the early
drainage cases." As long as the developer "acts upon his right to
protect his enjoyment of his own property, any incidental loss to his
neighbor is damnum absque injuria." 20 1
In the course of later cases, some of these common enemy rule
elements became confused with natural flow, civil law doctrines. For
example, the superior court in Beals v. Robertson202 mixed maxims
under both rules to hold that a mine operator had a right both to
install openings in a previously abandoned mine and to drain water
into a ravine forming a "natural watercourse" through his
neighbor's land.20 3 According to the court:
The defendants being the owners of the upper land, have the
right to have the water flowing from their land discharged in a
natural water course upon the lower (plaintiffs') land. While they
may not make new channels, nor concentrate and increase the
flow of waters by artificial means, they may- increase the flow
through the natural and reasonable use of their land. Being
descendible by nature, "waters flow and ought to flow" upon the
20 4
servient tenement, i.e. the lower land.
The court failed to explain why installation of an opening from a
deep mine to the surface, allowing water to drain where it had not
197. Id. at 508.
198. Id., quoting Strauss v. City of Allentown, 215 Pa. 96, 63 A. 1073 (1906); see
also Kuczineski v. Scranton Coal Co., 99 Pa. Super. Ct. 20 (1930).
199. Gordon v. Pettey, 291 Pa. 258, 139 A. 914 (1927).,
200. See Kuczineski v. Scranton Coal Co., 99 Pa. Super. Ct. 20, 24 (1930).
201. Rielly v. Stephenson, 222 Pa. 252, 256, 70 A. 1097, 1099 (1908).
202. 159 Pa. Super. Ct. 325, 48 A.2d 56 (1946), aff'd, 356 Pa. 348, 52 A.2d 316 (1947).
203. 159 Pa. Super. Ct. at 327, 48 A.2d at 57.
204. Id. at 327-28, 48 A.2d at 57, citing, inter alia, Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa.
407 (1856) (civil law rule applied), and Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. v. Pittston
Coal Mining Co., 289 Pa. 492, 137 A. 672 (1927) (common enemy rule applied).
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flowed previously, constituted a "natural and reasonable use" rather
than an "artificial concentration and discharge."205
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court similarly combined civil law
and common enemy rules in Lucas v. Ford,2 6 where it ruled that a
coal tipple owner could install pipes along a natural watercourse to
carry drainage from a public highway to the plaintiffs' land.
Although the pipes did not result "in any increase in the amount of
surface water reaching" the plaintiffs' property, they deposited oil,
dirt, and other sediment harmful to the land. 20 7 Finding that "some
type of drainage system was clearly necessary if defendants were to
make use of their property," 20 8 the court relied upon an odd fusion or confusion - of doctrines to explain when a lower landowner
incurs a legal injury:
The owner of upper land has the right to have surface
waters flowing on or over his land discharged through a natural
water course onto the land of another, but he may not cut an
artificial channel to divert that water ....
He may make proper
and profitable use of his land even though such use may result
in some change in quality or quantity of the water flowing to the
lower land ....
If that change is not unreasonable in relation
to the use, any loss resulting to the owner of the lower land is
damnum absque injuria ....

In that connection, the upper

owner may lay artificial drains in his land provided they do not
divert the water from its natural course or cause unnecessary
20 9
injury to the lower owner.
205. See 159 Pa. Super. Ct. at 327, 48 A.2d at 57; notes 178-193 and accompanying
text supra.
206. 363 Pa. 153, 69 A.2d 114 (1949).
207. Id. at 155, 69 A.2d at 116.
208. Id. at 156, 69 A.2d at 116.
209. Id. at 155-56, 69 A.2d at 116 (citations omitted). The similarity between the
Pennsylvania versions of the civil and common enemy rules was noted at least
indirectly in Chamberlin v. Ciaffoni, 373 Pa. 430, 96 A.2d 140 (1953), wherein the court
stated:
Under the so-called "common-law" or "common-enemy rule," not only is an owner
of higher land under no liability for damages to an owner of lower land caused by
water which naturally flows from the one level to the other, but he can, at least in
the development of urban property, improve his land by regrading it or erecting
buildings thereon, without legal responsibility for any consequent diversion of
surface waters from his property to that of adjoining owners, it being recognized
that changes or alterations in the surface may be essential to the enjoyment of his
property.
It is only where the owner of the higher land is guilty of negligence which
causes unnecessary damage to the servient owner, or where, by an artificial
channel, he collects and discharges surface waters in a body or precipitates them
in greatly increased quantities upon his neighbor, that the latter may recover for
any damage thereby inflicted.
Id. at 434-37, 96 A.2d at 142-43.
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By 1955, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Taylor v. Harrison
Construction Co.,210 had difficulty perceiving that a "distinction has
actually been made between urban and rural property. 2 11 In Taylor,
a construction company had deposited fill on lands below the
212
plaintiff blocking the natural runoff and causing pooling.
Although the upper landowner had argued successfully in the lower
court that the land was rural and that the natural flow rule would
prohibit the defendant from blocking the drainage, 213 the superior
court ruled that the owner of property could block the flow of surface
water without liability to the higher land owner, providing he did
not proceed negligently or obstruct a natural watercourse. 214 The
court, however, did not necessarily determine the continuing validity
of the rural-urban distinction, because it held, contrary to the lower
court, that the "uncontradicted" evidence showed that the area
2
involved was urban in character. 15
Massive residential and commercial developments in the mid1950's presented the courts with troublesome disputes challenging
the viability of common enemy drainage rules. In Rau v. Wilden
Acres, 21 6 for example, the court considered an action against the
developer of a large subdivision who had modified the drainage onto
a lower farm. Runoff had formerly flowed in a diffused state
through a swale to the plaintiffs lands. 217 In the process of
subdividing, constructing houses, and paving streets, the defendant
had lowered the swale, cut a channel through an earthen bank
previously erected across the swale mouth, and thereby funneled the
water into a body which discharged with greater force and in
increased quantities at a particular point on the plaintiffs lower
farm land. 21 The court found the defendant liable based upon the
artificial diversion exception to the common enemy rule, with the
crucial point apparently being the defendant's concentration of
waters which would have otherwise flowed in a more diffused state
219
through the swale.
210. 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 544, 115 A.2d 757 (1955).
211. Id. at 548, 115 A.2d at 759.
212. Id. at 546, 115 A.2d at 758.
213. See id. at 547, 115 A.2d at 759; see also notes 79-99 and accompanying text
supra.
214. 178 Pa. Super. Ct. at 547, 115 A.2d at 759. The term "watercourse" in this
context was that term as narrowly defined in Kislinski v. Gilboy, 19 Pa. Super. Ct.
453, 454 (1902). 178 Pa. Super. Ct. at 547 n.1, 115 A.2d at 759 n.1; see notes 18-20 and
accompanying text supra.
215. 178 Pa. Super. Ct. at 748, 115 A.2d at 759.
216. 376 Pa. 493, 103 A.2d 422 (1954).
217. Id. at 495, 103 A.2d at 424.
218. Id. at 496, 103 A.2d at 424.
219. Id.; accord, Posey v. Billings, 81 Montgomery County L. Rep. 199 (C.P. 1961);
Hall v. Tomer, 42 Westmoreland County L.J. 41 (C.P. 1960) (streets in subdivisions
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A similar situation was presented a year later in Leiper v.
Heywood-Hall Construction Co.,22° but with a different result. In
Leiper, the defendant erected a residential development of 149
dwellings on former farm lands. 221 No gutters, sewers, reservoirs, or
drains were installed to carry runoff, and waters from approximately

twelve acres of the development drained toward the plaintiffs
adjoining land through a natural gully. 222 The court found that "in
building the houses and laying out of its streets, [the defendant had]

necessarily diverted the flow of the water on its own property...
[as] a ... result of its proper and reasonable use of its land.

'223

The

plaintiffs complained of increased runoff, yet the trial court
concluded that the point of surface water discharge was not changed
and that the development did not "unreasonably and unnecessarily
change the quantity and quality" of the runoff.224 There is little
doubt, however, that the subdivision and installation of streets

substantially increased the amount of runoff. 225 The primary reason
that the defendant in Leiper avoided the liability imposed in Rau
appears to be that the construction company had merely surcharged
the natural gully with excess runoff, rather than installing artificial
drains to concentrate the water. 226 The fact that the impact of the
drainage upon the lower owners was substantially the same in both

cases did not deter the Leiper court from perpetuating the artificial
diversion/natural

channel

distinction. 227 In

essence, the court

changed natural drainage and concentrated water). In 1966, the Montgomery County
Court of Common Pleas interpreted Chamberlin v. Ciaffoni, 373 Pa. 430, 96 A.2d 140
(1953), and Rau as establishing four elements necessary to impose liability in a
drainage case: 1) a diversion of waters from their natural course; 2) an unreasonable
change in quantity or quality of the water; 3) a concentration and precipitation of
water upon plaintiffs' property through the use of artificial drains or channels; and 4)
damage to the plaintiffs' property which could have been avoided by reasonable care
and expenditure. Baker v. Netherwood Corp., 86 Montgomery County L. Rep. 281, 285
(C.P. 1966) (draining of spring through pipe to natural swale held nonactionable).
There may still be some dispute as to whether all four elements are required for
liability. The rule in Chamberlin would appear to hold the developer liable either 1)
where he is guilty of negligence to neighboring lands, or 2) where he collects surface
waters by an artificial channel and discharges them in concentrated form or greatly
increased quantities upon his neighbors. See 373 Pa. at 437, 96 A.2d at 143.
220. 381 Pa. 317, 113 A.2d 148 (1955).
221. Id. at 318, 113 A.2d at 148.
222. Id. at 319, 113 A.2d at 149.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 320, 113 A.2d at 149.
225. See id. at 318-19, 113 A.2d at 149.
226. See notes 218 & 222 and accompanying text supra.
227. 381 Pa. at 319, 113 A.2d at 149; see Watters v. North Star Coal Co., 112 Pittsb.
L.J. 413 (C.P. Allegheny 1964) (surface miner in rural area held liable for creating
artificial low point which concentrated runoff); Mackey v. Lubin, 9 Chester County L.
Rep. 193 (C.P. 1960) (increase of flow through natural valley 100-200 feet wide held
nonactionable, but piling of dirt which broke loose found to be negligent); Long v.
Eitner Homes, Inc., 6 Bucks County L. Rep. 91 (C.P. 1956).
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suggested that so long as the developer did nothing to control or
channel storm runoff, but merely increased it to the detriment of
neighbors, no liability would be found. 228 Yet the court was
cognizant of the "vexatious problems" arising in drainage cases
229
under the morass of Pennsylvania drainage rules.
The vexatiousness of those problems was amply demonstrated
when the Exeter Township School Authority constructed a new large
schoolhouse, surrounded by extensive impervious surfaces and
athletic fields, all graded, guttered and drained for "prompt escape of
rainfall." 230 The county court narrowly construed the Rau "concentration" rule and exonerated the school authority from liability for
31
the "bane" of flooding imposed upon adjacent homes.
232
Westbury Realty Corp. v. Lancaster Shopping Center, Inc.

finally stretched the Pennsylvania rules to their breaking point. The
defendant's shopping center covered seventeen acres with buildings
and nonpourous material in a "rural" area.23 3 Since the center lacked

a sewer system, storm water flowed off in a diffused state, flooding
neighboring properties and making adjacent land unsuitable for
development or use. 234 Neither negligence nor concentration of water

in an artificial channel was alleged, but the supreme court,
acknowledging the need for new attitudes, characterized the
shopping center as an "artificial" land use and held that the action
would lie.2 35 The court suggested that it was surely reasonable to
228. See 381 Pa. at 320-21, 113 A.2d at 149-50.
229. See id. at 321-22, 113 A.2d at 150. The court noted:
The many and large real estate developments. . . in the last ten years and the
building of thousands of homes have brought to the Courts many drainage
problems, both sanitary and surface water. Each problem is to some extent unique
and while the basic rules of law seem to be well settled, the application of these
rules to a particular case is very often a difficult matter.
Id.
230. Herbein v. Exeter Township School Auth., 48 Berks County L. Rep. 137 (C.P.
1956), aff'g 47 Berks County L. Rep. 289 (C.P. 1955).
231. 48 Berks County L. Rep. at 138.
232. 396 Pa. 383, 152 A.2d 669 (1959). Mr. Justice Bell, who dissented, later claimed
that Westbury Realty overruled by implication more than 20 prior decisions. See Webb
v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 429 & n.2, 220 A.2d 853, 855 & n.2 (1966) (Bell, J., dissenting).
233. 396 Pa. at 385, 152 A.2d at 670.
234. Id. at 387-88, 152 A.2d at 672.
235. Id. at 388, 152 A.2d at 672. In so holding, the court stated:
Even though the shopping center is developed in a rural section, the center
has all the characteristics of an urban development. This requires new attitudes,
both on behalf of the developers as well as the court. While the owners of higher
lands have the right to have the water flowing from their lands discharged in a
natural watercourse upon the lower lands, and while the upper lands may
increase the flow through the natural and reasonable use of the lands, a large
shopping center development in a rural area, as in the instant case, cannot be
considered a natural use of the land. It surely was not a contemplated use of the
land when our concepts of water flow were developed. Rather, it is an artificialuse
of the land for which the developers must make the proper accommodation so as
not to place the burden of the increased flow upon the servient tenement.
Id. (emphasis added).
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require the shopping center developer to bear the relatively small
cost of installing adequate drainage facilities to prevent "water
drainage hardship" to others.2 36 In effect, the court came close to
237
readopting the long-forgotten rule of Bentz.
Few could quarrel with the court's plea for new attitudes
regarding drainage problems. Unfortunately, although the majority
of justices evidently desired to change the law,2 38 the Westbury
Realty decision failed to announce clear new standards to guide
developers or aggrieved landowners. The arbitrary classification of
shopping centers as "artificial" land uses 239 leaves a great deal to
conjecture. Should equally large residential subdivisions, industrial
parks, planned unit developments, or school complexes be treated as
"artificial" or "natural and reasonable" uses of land? What
difference should the purpose or type of the defendant's development
make when the impact of increased runoff is injurious to neighboring lands? Why not require all those engaged in land development to
take reasonable care to control drainage in order to avoid harm to
others? Experience gained from development in the past century and
refinement of hydrologic science has made the storm water
management problems stemming from alterations of land slope,
cover, and use reasonably predictable and assessable. 240 Since steps
can be taken in designing and implementing development plans to
avoid or ameliorate drainage problems, 241 continued exoneration of
developers from liability for the avoidable injurious consequences of
their activities, based upon one-sided rules and arbitrary exceptions,
hardly seems justified.
Regrettably, the supreme court's inclination toward a "new
attitude" has not curtailed vexatious suits. Nor have Pennsylvania's
lower courts responded to the supreme court's invitation in

236. Id. The complaint alleged that the problem could be remedied by an
expenditure of $9,600, an amount the court considered insignificant in light of the
total investment represented by a 17-acre shopping center. Id.
237. See notes 55-62 and accompanying text supra.
238. See 396 Pa. at 389, 152 A.2d at 672 (Bell, J., dissenting).
239. See note 235 and accompanying text supra.
240. See note 7 supra.
241. See generally NORTHEAST REGIONAL TECHNICAL SERVICE CENTER, SOIL
CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, GUIDELINES FOR THE CONTROL
OF EROSION AND SEDIMENT IN URBAN AREAS OF THE NORTHEAST (1970); SOIL
CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ENGINEERING FIELD MANUAL
FOR CONSERVATION
PRACTICES ch. 2-3, 6-11,
13-16 (1969); N.J. STATE SOIL
CONVERSATION COMM'N, STANDARDS FOR SOIL EROSION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL IN

NEW JERSEY 2.1-4.74 (1972); A. O'DELL, W.A. THURBERT & T.E. FRITZ, REGIONAL
STORM DRAINAGE PLAN 86-99 (1973) [hereinafter cited as O'DELL]; PA. DEP'T OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, SOIL EROSION AND SEDIMENTATION CONTROL MANUAL
(1976); PHILADELPHIA CITY PLANNING COMM'N, WISSAHICKON WATERSHED DE-

VELOPMENT GUIDE 7-15 (1975).
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subsequent drainage cases. Although many post-1960 cases have
imposed liability on developers for substantial damage created by
runoff under the rubric of the artificial diversion, collection, and
concentration exceptions to the common enemy rule,242 decisions in
the past fifteen years have perfunctorily relied upon the same
243
anachronistic doctrines, distinctions, and aphorisms.
Despite the Pennsylvania lower courts' reluctance to recognize
or propose a more rational drainage law, the recent decision of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc.,244 purportedly applying
state law, 245 signifies a major advancement. The district court
adjudicated a complaint instituted by farm owners in Lower
Macungie Township against a developer, his engineer, and municipal officials in neighboring Alburtis Borough for negligently failing
246
to control storm water drainage from a large home subdivision.
The developer substantially increased the runoff onto the plaintiffs'
farms by grading the land and filling a marshy retention area,
thereby precluding the cultivation of strawberries. 247 The court could

have relied upon the unlawful collection and diversion doctrine; 248
instead, it interpreted Westbury Realty and Lucas as imposing
liability upon a mere showing that the upper landowner, by intent or
negligence, unreasonably or unnecessarily increased the flow of
surface water. 249 The court readily found negligence as well as
substantial evidence of intent. 250 Since the developer in Breiner had
242. See notes 178-193 and accompanying text supra.
243. See, e.g., St. Andrew's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Lower Providence
Township, 414 Pa. 40, 198 A.2d 860 (1964) (municipality held liable for installation of
drainage pipe artificially funneling runoff from nearby development onto church
parsonage); Conn v. Fisher, 64 Lancaster County L. Rep. 413 (C.P. 1975) (no liability
without artificial diversion or negligence); Good v. Boorse, 21 Chester County L. Rep.
1 (C.P. 1973) (downstream landowner who blocked drainage held not liable, since he
did not obstruct a natural stream, or block diffuse surface water in a negligent
fashion); Baker v. Netherwood Corp., 86 Montgomery County L. Rep. 281 (C.P. 1966)
(developer held not liable for collection and discharge of spring waters through pipe to
"natural swale," since waters were not "diverted" from their natural course,
unreasonably changed in quantity or quality, or concentrated in a manner to cause
unavoidable harm to neighbors); Watters v. North Star Coal Co., 112 Pittsb. L.J. 413
(C.P. Allegheny 1964) (coal company held liable for creating "artificial low point"
which concentrated water); Posey v. Billings, 81 Montgomery County L. Rep. (C.P.
1961) (homeowner held liable for filling swale and concentrating formerly diffuse
runoff); Hall v. Tomer, 42 Westmoreland County L.J. 41 (C.P. 1960) (subdivision
developer ordered to install catch basins and eliminate water artificially diverted by
streets and adjoining ditches).
244. 398 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd in part, 536 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1976).
245. 398 F. Supp. at 252.
246. Id. at 251.
247. Id. at 251-52.
248. See notes 178-193 and accompanying text supra.
249. 398 F. Supp. at 253.
250. Id.
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received clear warnings from his neighbors of the potential
accelerated runoff problem, 25 1 there was no question that the
defendants should have known or could have foreseen the harm
resulting from the development scheme. Although the district court's
holding in favor of the adjacent farm owners was unanimously
upheld by the Third Circuit, 252 the federal courts' liberal application
of Pennsylvania case law has yet to be embraced by Pennsylvania
state courts.
G.

Summary of Pennsylvania DrainageRules

At present, Pennsylvania's drainage rules can be summarized as
follows: 253
1. A landowner may not obstruct or divert the natural flow of a
watercourse or natural drainage course to the injury of another. 25 41 In
urban areas, "natural drainage course" is narrowly interpreted to
include only streams with well-defined channels and banks. 25 5 In
rural areas, the term is more broadly construed, apparently
256
including the flow and direction of diffused surface waters.
2. A landowner may, at least in urban areas, obstruct the flow
of diffused surface waters not flowing in a natural watercourse, if
257
the obstruction is conducted in a nonnegligent manner.
3. A landowner may not artificially collect or concentrate
unusually large quantities of diffused surface waters and discharge
25 8
them onto adjoining properties.
4. A landowner may not divert onto another's land runoff from
259
an area which would not have naturally drained in that direction.
5. A landowner may not unreasonably or unnecessarily change
26
the quantity or quality of water drained in a natural channel. 0
6. A landowner may, in the nonnegligent, "natural and
reasonable" improvement of his land, increase the runoff flow of
251. Id.
252. Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 536 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1976) (developer
found liable).
253. For a comparison with other states' approaches to drainage problems, see 5
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, §§456.1-.2.
254. Chamberlin v. Ciaffoni, 373 Pa. 430, 436-37, 96 A.2d 140, 143 (1953); Lucas v.
Ford, 363 Pa. 153, 155, 69 A.2d 114, 116 (1949).
255. See notes 152-160 and accompanying text supra.
256. See notes 114-127 and accompanying text supra.
257. See Yenchko v. Grontkowski, 385 Pa. 272, 122 A.2d 705 (1956); Kinkle v. Ford
City Borough, 305 Pa. 416, 420-21, 158 A. 159, 160 (1932); Taylor v. Harrison Constr.
Co., 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 544, 115 A.2d 757 (1955); Good v. Boorse, 21 Chester County L.
Rep. 1 (C.P. 1973).
258. Rau v. Wilden Acres, 376 Pa. 493, 103 A.2d 422 (1954); Posey v. Billings, 81
Montgomery County L. Rep. 199 (C.P. 1961); Hall v. Tomer, 42 Westmoreland County
L.J. 41 (C.P. 1960).
259. See Frederick v. Lansdale Borough, 156 Pa. 613, 27 A. 563 (1893).
260. Lucas v. Ford, 363 Pa. 153, 155, 69 A.2d 114, 116 (1949).
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diffused waters or waters drained in a natural watercourse, subject
261
to the rules against diversion, collection, and concentration.
7. A landowner engaged in "artificial" improvement of his land,
such as the construction of shopping centers and other large
developments, must take reasonable precautions to control the
discharge of accelerated runoff and protect adjoining lands from
26
avoidable harm.

2

8. Although a landowner may be held responsible for negligent
modification of drainage, particularly through failure to maintain
proper drainage structures, 63 Pennsylvania courts have traditionally accorded deference to relatively unrestricted development of
land. 26 41 Few decisions involving developers and injured neighboring

265
landowners have imposed liability based upon negligence.
However, if the recent federal decision in Breiner266 is followed by
state courts, the negligence test could be broadened to require all
who alter drainage or accelerate runoff to take reasonable steps in
the design and implementation of development projects to protect
other lands and avoid increased flooding downstream - a duty not
unlike that imposed by the earliest, but now abandoned or forgotten,
Pennsylvania drainage cases. 26 7 Unfortunately, a clear statement of
such duty has yet to be announced by modern Pennyslvania
decisions.
The hackneyed rhetoric of the common enemy rule lingers,
confused by phrases borrowed from civil law cases. In the absence of
a more thoughtful approach reflecting the realities of modern
development practices, hydrologic science, and the public's interest
in preventing escalation of flooding conflicts, Pennsylvania drainage law will continue to contribute to the Commonwealth's storm
water management problem.

261. See Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Constr. Co., 381 Pa. 317, 320, 113 A.2d 148, 149-50
(1955); Chamberlin v. Ciaffoni, 370 Pa. 430, 96 A.2d 140 (1953); Herbein v. Exeter
Township School Auth., 48 Berks County L. Rep. 137 (C.P. 1956).
262. Westbury Realty Corp. v. Lancaster Shopping Center, Inc., 396 Pa. 383, 152
A.2d 669 (1959).
263. See Yenchko v. Grontkowski, 385 Pa. 272, 122 A.2d 705 (1956).
264. See, e.g., Rielly v. Stephenson, 222 Pa. 252, 256-57, 70 A. 1097, 1099 (1908).
265. Compare Yenchko v. Grontkowski, 385 Pa. 272, 122 A.2d 705 (1956)
(negligence found in blocking drain pipe and piling dirt), and Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165
Pa. 267, 30 A. 844 (1895) (negligence found in disposal of waste saline water from oil
well), with Good v. Boorse, 21 Chester County L. Rep. 1 (C.P. 1973) (no negligence
found when mound of earth forced surface flow onto plaintiff's land), and Mackey v.
Lubin, 9 Chester County L. Rep. 193 (C.P. 1960) (negligence found in constructing
artificial channel to discharge greater volume of surface flow upon neighbor's
property).
266. See notes 244-252 and accompanying text supra.
267. See notes 55-78 & 170-177 and accompanying text supra.
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H. Remedies in Private Drainage Disputes
Assuming a landowner has pleaded and proved a valid cause of
action against unlawful drainage of surface water, a variety of
remedies may be available, depending upon the circumstances. An
aggrieved party may be entitled to injunctive relief, damages, or self268
help to abate the drainage nuisance.
1. Equitable Remedies
Equitable remedies, in the form of injunctions against continuing unlawful drainage, may be granted at the court's discretion. 26 9 In
determining whether such relief should be granted, a number of
factors are relevant, including: 1) adequacy of remedies at law; 2)
irreparable nature of damages; 3) comparative benefits and costs to
the plaintiff and defendant; 4) prevention of a multiplicity of law
suits; 5) temporary or permanent nature of the injury; 6) whether the
equitable relief requested will require "mandatory" or "affirmative"
action by the defendant; 7) imminence of threatened injury; and 8)
270
whether the injury is a continuing one.
In most instances, where development of land or other action by
the defendant has created an unlawful drainage condition - for
example, the artificial collection and concentration of storm runoff
- the injury claimed is continuing in nature. Denial of injunctive
relief would result in multiple legal actions to recover the successive
damages resulting from the condition. In such circumstances,
Pennsylvania courts have not hesitated to grant an injunction
271
directing the defendant to cease the illegal drainage activity.
Where the unlawful drainage was the temporary result of construction activities and has been corrected, injunctive relief generally will
not be appropriate, although damages for the injury incurred may be
available.2 72 In addition, equitable defenses, such as "unclean
273
hands" may bar injunctive relief.
A close reading of the Pennsylvania cases up to 1958 suggests
that the "balancing equities" factor may have led, sub silentio, to
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 458.
269. See, e.g., St. Andrew's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Lower Providence

268. See generally 5

Township, 414 Pa. 40, 198 A.2d 860 (1964); Rau v. Wilden Acres, 376 Pa. 493, 103 A.2d
422 (1954); Culbertson v. Gross, 77 York County L. Rec. 50 (C.P. 1962).

270. 5

WATER RIGHTS,

supra note 12, §548.1.

271. See, e.g., St. Andrew's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Lower Providence
Twp., 414 Pa. 40, 198 A.2d 860 (1964); Rau v. Wilden Acres, 376 Pa. 493, 103 A.2d 422
(1954); Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co. v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 289 Pa. 492, 137
A. 672 (1927); Posey v. Billings, 81 Montgomery County L. Rep. 199 (C.P. 1961).
272. See Long v. Eitner Homes, Inc., 6 Bucks County L. Rep. 91 (C.P. 1956).
273. See Snow v. D'Annunzio, 72 Dauphin County L. Rep. 219 (C.P. 1958).
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many of the seemingly arbitrary quirks of state drainage law. A
typical case involved a private property owner requesting injunctive
relief against an adjacent land development, often a significant
residential subdivision. In judging whether an injunction should be
issued, the courts balanced the harm to the defendant if the relief
were granted against the injuries imposed upon the plaintiff by the
drainage conditions. Unfortunately, rarely did the courts expressly
articulate this consideration. 274 In most cases, the court merely
assumed that the benefits of "progress" represented by the
defendant's activity outweighed harm to others, "which they [had to]
accept as one of the unavoidable burdens of community, and
especially urban life. '275 Instead of properly limiting the balance of
equities factor to the issue of whether to grant an injunction, the
Pennsylvania courts invented a maze of distinctions and rationales
to deny all relief, including the award of damages to significantly
276
injured landowners.
Where injunctive relief was found to be justified, Pennsylvania
courts seldom used equitable remedies in a creative fashion. Most
cases have culminated in an order merely requiring the defendant to
cease unlawful drainage or unlawful collection and discharge of
storm runoff. How, when, and whether this could be accomplished
was not usually specified. In one dispute, however, the Westmoreland County Court was more definite; after reviewing specific
alternatives proposed by the plaintiff, it ordered the defendant
subdivision developer to install catch basins and drains to eliminate
the discharge of runoff onto neighboring properties. 277 Although it is
certain that courts are not equipped with the facilities to design and
supervise programs to alleviate storm water management problems,
judicial reluctance to frame more specific relief necessitates final
resolution of disputes through private agreement or subsequent
litigation regarding compliance with the court's order. A requirement that the defendant submit to the court and all parties a
hydrologic and engineering plan for abating the problem and
establish a schedule for implementing the plan would be a preferable
arrangement. 278 If the complaining parties feel the plan is inade-

274. See Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 267, 30 A. 844 (1895); Culbertson v. Gross, 77
York County L. Rep. 50 (C.P. 1962).
275. Chamberlin v. Ciaffoni, 373 Pa. 430, 437, 96 A.2d 140, 143 (1953).
276. See, e.g., Taylor v. Harrison Constr. Co., 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 544, 547, 115 A.2d
757, 759 (1955); Herbein v. Exeter Township School Auth., 48 Berks County L. Rep.
137 (C.P. 1956).
277. Hall v. Tomer, 42 Westmoreland County L.J. 41 (C.P. 1960).
278. See Commonwealth v. Hamm, Cumberland County C.P., No. 1 (Jan. Term
1973) (settled by consent order).
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quate or improper, at least such disputes can be resolved expeditiously before inadequate, expensive, or unnecessary action is taken.
2.

Damages

Even where equitable relief is unavailable or inappropriate,
compensatory damages are a possible remedy for drainage injuries. 279 Two problems may arise in obtaining damages: proof of
damage and measurement of loss. Damages may not be awarded on
the basis of speculation, hypothesis, or conjecture; there must be
credible evidence of loss. 2 0 Moreover, the plaintiff must establish
causation between the defendant's actions and the damage. 28 ' Even
where the defendant unlawfully alters drainage patterns, the court
may deny damages for injuries that were proximately caused by an
extraordinary storm or flood, and not directly by the defendant's
2 2
acts.
The measurement of compensatory damages is often a difficult
matter, sometimes compounded by uncertainty as to whether the
intermittent or recurring injury created by drainage problems is
permanent or temporary in nature. If the drainage problem could be
remedied by the defendant, either voluntarily or at the court's order,
the dispute might be addressed by successive damage actions, which
might convince the defendant to abate the noxious condition. In
contrast, where permanent compensation is awarded for all past,
present, and projected injury to the plaintiff, the defendant in effect
acquires an easement to continue the offending condition without
2
further liability. 813
Where permanent damages are awarded, the basic measure of
compensation is the diminution in value of the affected real estate,
that is, the difference in market value before and after the loss. 284 A
279. 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 458; see Leupold v. Hyman Korman, Inc., 84
Montgomery County L. Rep. 376 (C.P. 1964); Keim v. Tyson, 53 Westmoreland County
L. Rep. (C.P. 1961); Mackey v. Lubin, 9 Chester County L. Rep. 193 (C.P. 1959). The
test in granting injunctive relief fundamentally involves a balancing of equities,
including the relative value of the defendant's activities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 941 (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976).'In assessing damages, the relative value of
the defendant's acts should be irrelevant. Even if it has significant public value, if it
unreasonably injures the property of another, compensation may be granted although
an injunction might be denied. See W. PROSSER, supra note 54, §90.
280. 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 458.2(B).
281. Id.
282. Hall v. Tomer, 42 Westmoreland County L.J. 41 (C.P. 1960).
28:3. See Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N.C. 566, 58 S.E.2d 343 (1950); 5 WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 12, at 586-87 & n.90.
284. 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 458.2; see Breiner v. C & P Home Builders,
Inc., 398 F. Supp. 250, 259 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd in part, 536 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1976);
Lucot v. Rodgers, 159 Pa. 58, 28 A. 242 (1893); Weir v. Plymouth Borough, 148 Pa. 566,
24 A. 94 (1892).
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lesser amount may be awarded equal to the reasonable cost of curing
the condition and restoration, including costs of drains, channels,
and rights-of-way across the plaintiffs land.28 5 If an injunction is

granted or the offending condition is abated before completion of the
suit, damages may be awarded only for the period of injury. 28 6 Such
damages may be measured on the basis of reduced rental value while
the damage continued, 28 7 or the costs of restoring the injured
288
property to its original condition.
3. Self-Help
The right of a landowner to protect his property against a
nuisance by "self-help" abatement is recognized under common
law. 219 The self-help right permits the correction of the unlawful
condition without breach of the peace. If an owner can erect upon his
own property a barrier to unlawful drainage without trespass upon
the lands of another, self-help may be available. 290 Trespassory selfhelp, however, is strongly. discouraged. 291
The self-help remedy in Pennsylvania is hopelessly confused
with the common enemy rule allowing landowners - at least in
urban areas - to block out surface water drainage even though the
natural or increased flow from above is lawful. 292 Only in In re
Limerick & Colebrookedale Turnpike Co. 293 was self-help properly

applied to allow abatement of a clearly unlawful discharge of
accelerated runoff. In most other cases, the courts have condoned, if
not encouraged, a neighborhood contest of pipes and dikes in which
24
breach of the peace is an inevitable result.

II.

SPECIAL RULES FOR STATE FACILITY DRAINAGE

Like modern shopping and residential developments, state
highways and other facilities often have a significant effect upon the
285. Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 250, 259 (E.D. Pa. 1975),

aff'd in part, 536 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1976); Lucot v. Rodgers, 159 Pa. 58, 28 A. 242 (1893);
Leupolf v. Hyman Korman, Inc., 84 Montgomery County L. Rep. 376 (C.P. 1964); see

Battisto v. Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 124 A.2d 288 (1965).
286. Weir v. Plymouth Borough, 148 Pa. 566, 24 A. 94 (1892); Mackey v. Lubin, 9
Chester County L. Rep. 193 (C.P. 1959); Allen v. Woodhaven Constr. Co., 75
Montgomery County L. Rep. 120, (C.P. 1959); Long v. Eitner Homes, Inc., 6 Bucks
County L. Rep. 91 (C.P. 1956) (dicta).
287. Chesarone v. Pinewood Builders, Inc., 345 Mass. 236, 186 N.E.2d 712 (1965);
see McCartney v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 257 (1903).
288. Mackey v. Lubin, 9 Chester County L. Rep. 193 (C.P. 1959).
289. 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, § 458.4; see W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 90.
290, In re Limerick & Colebrookedale Turnpike Co., 80 Pa. 425 (1876).
291. See Davies v. Shaffer, 58 Lackawanna Jur. 73 (C.P. 1956); 5 WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 12, § 458.3.
292. See, e.g., Taylor v. Harrison Constr. Co., 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 544, 115 A.2d 757
(1955); Good v. Boorse, 21 Chester County L. Rep. 1 (C.P. 1973).
293. 80 Pa. 425 (1876); see notes 105-108 and accompanying text supra.
294. Maloney & Plager, supra note 35, at 78.
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quantity, velocity, direction, and quality of storm water runoff. Since
such projects are undertaken by the Commonwealth, special
constitutional, statutory, and judicial rules are applicable to the
resolution of drainage conflicts with neighboring lands.
Traditionally, Pennsylvania's liability for damage to lands
adjoining Commonwealth projects has been narrowly construed.
While the Pennsylvania Constitution requires "municipal and other
corporations" vested with eminent domain powers to make just
compensation for "property taken, injured or destroyed by the
construction or enlargement of their works, highways or improvements," 295 state liability extends only to property "taken or applied
to public use. '296 Thus, unless otherwise provided for by statute, the
Commonwealth has no obligation to compensate for consequential

damages occasioned by state projects when property is not actually
taken. 297 Over the years, a number of cases have held that alteration
of drainage patterns, causing flooding of lands adjacent to state
projects, does not constitute a taking of property, and may' be

actionable only where the Commonwealth has statutorily consented
298
to compensate for the resulting "consequential" injury.

A few circumscribed statutes explicitly provide for compensation
of consequential drainage damages by the Commonwealth. For
299
example, section 417 of the State Highway Law (Highway Law)

authorizes the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) to "enter upon any lands . . . and cut, open, maintain, and
repair such drains or ditches, inlets or outlets . . . as are necessary to
carry the waters from. . . highways . . . constructed or improved at
295. PA. CONST. art. 10, § 4.

296. Id. art. 1, § 10.
297. See, e.g., Ewalt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 382 Pa. 529, 534, 115 A.2d
729, 731 (1955); Heil v. Allegheny County, 330 Pa. 449, 453, 199 A. 341, 343 (1938). The
law in Pennsylvania has been summarized as follows:
It is well established that acts not done in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and not the immediate, necessary or unavoidable consequence of the
right, cannot be the basis of any claim in that proceeding.. . . No recovery can be
had in an eminent domain proceeding where one's injuries result from a trespass.
• . . By the same token, a de facto taking cannot result from negligent acts
committed by agents of the body charged with the power of eminent domain.
In re Condemnation of 2719, 2721, & 2711 E. Berkshire St., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 601,
605, 343 A.2d 67, 69 (1975) (citations omitted).
298. Ewalt v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 382 Pa. 529, 115 A.2d 729 (1955)
(liability for erosion damage based on statute); Heid v. Allegheny County, 122 Pa.
Super. Ct. 312, 186 A. 215 (1936) (compensation for drainage damage denied); New
York Cent. R.R. v. Venango County, 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 161 A. 488 (1932)
(compensation for drainage damage denied); Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v.
Palmer Township, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 270, 329 A.2d 871 (1974) (liability for drainage
damage ruled outside statutory provision, compensation denied); see West Branch &
Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Mulliner, 68 Pa. 357, 360 (1871) (Commonwealth not liable
for damages caused when raised canal water flooded adjacent land and home).
299. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-417 (Purdon 1961).
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the expense of the Commonwealth or under its supervision."" Any
damage incurred by landowners whose property is "entered upon by
the department [PennDOT] for such purposes" is recoverable under
the eminent domain provisions of the Highway Law. 30 1 Surprisingly,

since adoption of this provision in 1945,302 Pennsylvania courts have
not been called upon to interpret its substantive application to

drainage disputes. However, on the basis of the distinction between
consequential damages and a taking of property, at least one court
has narrowly construed language nearly identical to section 417,
contained in a prior highway act. 30 3 The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania in Heid v. Allegheny County3 4 ruled that, absent
physical entry by the highway agency onto private lands to install

drains, no liability could be imposed on the Commonwealth. 30 5 The
courts have not awarded damages to injured property owners where
the state merely installs a gutter on a road right-of-way to collect

and divert the surface water and release it at the boundary line of a
private owner. 3 6 While a municipality could be held liable in
trespass for damages caused by similar road improvements which
diverted storm water from its natural course, 30 7 no legislative
authority existed to impose a similar responsibility on the Common308
wealth.

Since the Heid case, legislative reform of the Eminent Domain
Code (Code) 30 9 has, at least partially, expanded the Commonwealth's

liability for consequential damage claims in highway cases. Section
612 of the Code provides that, where drainage is altered by the
change of highway grade and damages abutting property, the
Commonwealth must provide just compensation. 3 10 Yet, this language also has received a narrow interpretation by Pennsylvania
courts. The state, for example, is not required to compensate for
300. Id.
301. Id.

302. Act of June 1, 1945, No. 428, § 417, 1945 Pa. Laws 1242.
303. Act of April 29, 1925, No. 212, §§ 1, 3, 1925 Pa. Laws 360, as amended by Act of
April 10, 1929, No. 195, § 1, 1929 Pa. Laws 477.
304. 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 312, 186 A. 215 (1936).
305. Id. at 318, 186 A. at 217.
306. Id. at 317, A. at 217; see New York Cent. R.R. v. Venango County, 105 Pa.
Super Ct. 245, 161 A. 488 (1932).
307. See 122 Pa. Super. Ct. at 314-15, 186 A. at 216 (1936), citing Yocum v. Union
Township, 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 540 (1929). See also notes 325-351 and accompanying text
infra.
308. See 122 Pa. Super. Ct. at 318, 186 A. at 216 (1936).
309. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-101 to 1-903 (Supp. 1975).
310. Id. § 1-612. Section 612 of the Code states: "All condemnors, including the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, shall be liable for damages to property abutting the
area of an improvement resulting from change of grade of a road or highway,
permanent interference with access thereto, or injury to surface support, whether or
not any property is taken." Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [1977], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 22: p. 901

damages caused by highway drainage alterations to .municipal
31
roads and lands which do not actually abut the state project.
Thus, if an alteration of a highway grade causes drainage to flow
across A's abutting strip of land, from whence it flows onto
properties of B, C, and D, thereby causing significant injury to their
homes and lands, the Commonwealth would be obligated to
compensate A only.
Moreover, it should be noted that section 612 applies only to
drainage damages caused by highway grade changes, Installation of
road drains, without entry onto adjacent properties or a grade
change, is not covered, nor is drainage from nonhighway facilities.
Although specific project enabling acts may potentially authorize
compensation for damage caused by state facility drainage, no other
statutes have been found which generally address. the issue of
recovery for such injuries.
While the Commonwealth asserts a privilege to alter drainage to
the detriment of neighboring downslope lands with only limited
liability, it imposes more stringent restrictions on the right of
property owners to drain across or through state facilities. In
addition to the normal rights of a landowner regarding drainage
from upslope properties, 312 state statutes provide special drainage
controls to protect Commonwealth projects. The Highway Law, for
example, prohibits any landowner from filling up, injuring, diverting, or changing the course of any highway drain or ditch without
PennDOT permission.3 13 Under provisions allowing PennDOT to
regulate highway use, 314 policies have been adopted restricting the
utilization of highway drainage facilities by upper landowners in
order to protect the capacity of such drains and, avoid injury to
315
roads.
The continued viability of the current rules governing drainage
from Commonwealth facilities is, at best, questionable. Particularly
troublesome are the metaphysical distinctions between consequen311. Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. Palmer Township, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 270,
329 A.2d 871 (1974). If, however, a municipality had caused the same damage while
constructing a road, it would have been held fully liable, regardless of whether the
injured property abutted the highway right-of-way. This liability is based on the rule
that a municipality engaged in a highway or other project which materially affects
drainage and is sufficiently near to private lands to make the injury proximate,
immediate and substantial, will be required to pay just compensation. In re Chatham
St., 191 Pa. 604, 605-06, 43 A. 365, 365 (1899).
312. See notes 194-252 and accompanying text supra.
313. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-417 (Purdon 1961).
314. Id. §670-420.
315. PA. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEP'T OF HIGHWAYS, RULES AND
REGULATIONS, ch. 1 (1969); PA. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, DRAINAGE REPORT (Circ.

Letter No. E-2132, Oct. 25, 1974).
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tial drainage damages, for which no compensation is necessary, and
the entering and taking of property, for which just compensation is
required;3 16 and the dichotomy between abutting and nonabutting
lands.3 17 As the superior court noted forty years ago in Heid, where
the Commonwealth alters drainage, collects, concentrates, and
discharges the flow of storm water across a citizen's lands, the
property owner "has a real grievance and should be given relief
..

-3..It is difficult to argue that, where drainage from state

facilities destroys crops, floods fields and structures, or erodes
channels across private properties, the resulting damage is consequential and not an unconstitutional taking of lands without
compensation. Although some Pennsylvania courts have adhered to
the restricted and often contorted concepts of Commonwealth
liability for property damage3 1 9 requiring an actual entry and taking
or a statutory allowance of consequential damages, this position has
been significantly undermined by evolving doctrines of inverse
condemnation under the Federal Constitution. The test of taking
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments rests upon whether the
owner is substantially deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment
of property. 32 Physical entry by a government agent is not required
to find inverse condemnation. Just as aircraft noise in the vicinity of
a government airport can "take" a noise easement, storm runoff
from state and local projects diverted across citizens' lands without
appropriate controls can "take" a drainage easement. 321 The
Commonwealth should not be able to constitutionally escape liability
by terming the deprivation a "consequential damage." The duty to
pay just compensation flows from the state's action in substantially
injuring private property, partially or totally depriving an owner of
the beneficial use of his land, and not from artificial labels applied to
the mode of injury. "22 To the extent that much of Pennsylvania
drainage law, as applied to Commonwealth projects, rests upon such
labels, it must be deemed frail indeed.
The weakness of the traditional, artificial rules seems to have
been recognized by the most active state agencies. Both PennDOT
and the Department of Environmental Resources (DER), in conduct316. See notes 295-308 and accompanying text supra.
317. See notes 309-311 and accompanying text supra.
318. 122 Pa. Super. Ct. at 318; 186 A. at 217.
319. See, e.g., In re Condemnation of 2719, 2721 & 2711 E. Berkshire St., 20 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 601, 343 A.2d 67 (1975); Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. Palmer
Township, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 270, 329 A.2d 871 (1974).
320. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946).
321. Capristo v. Commonwealth, 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 715, 718-20 (C.P. Luzerne 1972).
322. Id.
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ing highway, park, and mine restoration projects, have recently
pursued more positive programs to prevent drainage conflicts with
neighboring properties. 323 When conflicts arise, both agencies have
tended to settle the disputes without extended litigation, generally
accepting a duty to dispose of drainage in the same manner legally
expected of any nongovernmental entity. Pennsylvania law, however, is not yet as progressive as the attitude of some executive
agencies, and citizens have no legal guarantee that their particular
dispute will be resolved amicably. Unless the Commonwealth's
statutory or case law is modified, the rights of Pennsylvania
property owners will remain dependent upon executive goodwill.
III.

MUNICIPAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR STORM WATER MANAGEMENT

Perhaps no more confusing area of drainage law exists than
that related to municipal authority and responsibility for storm
water management. Municipalities 32 may act in a variety of ways
that directly or indirectly affect drainage. They may proceed as
public land developers, grading and paving streets and constructing
public schools or other facilities. They may also serve as proprietors
of storm sewer or flood control projects. Local governments may
function simultaneously as planning and regulatory bodies, reviewing and approving private development plans in accordance with
state statutes and local ordinances. Different duties to the public and
private landowners arise from each of these activities. The
complications resulting from the changing doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity and the special problems of appropriate
remedies and procedures to correct grievances against local
governmental units further confuse the responsibility and power of
municipalities for storm water management. This section will
attempt both a functional and historical analysis of the municipal
role in storm water management, concluding with a discussion of
some exemplary municipal efforts in this field.

323. See Interview with James J. Kutz, Assistant Attorney Gen., Pennsylvania
Dep't of Transp. (July 22, 1976); Interview with John Carroll and Gary Martin,
Assistant Attorneys Gen., Bureau of Legal Services, Pa. Dep't of Environmental
Resources (July 26, 1976).
324. The term "municipalities," for the purposes of this section, includes counties,
cities, boroughs and townships, as well as single-purpose municipal corporations such
as school districts and municipal authorities. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1991
(Supp. 1976).
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Municipal Responsibility for Drainage from Public Facilities

Municipalities are authorized to execute a wide variety of public
improvements, 325 including the grading and paving of streets,
installation of bridges, and construction of schools, all of which may
accelerate or alter storm water runoff. Quite often these projects are
extensive and cumulative in nature, and have a serious effect upon
drainage patterns and neighboring lands. The quantity of litigation
over such public improvements reflects the scope and seriousness of
the impact of municipal activities upon storm water management.
The common law rules applicable to runoff from public facilities
parallel private drainage law doctrines. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's opinion in Strauss3 26 provides the broadest reading of the
common enemy rule as applied to municipal projects. The plaintiff,
the owner of a mill located just outside Allentown's city limits,
complained that the paving, opening, and enlargement of streets,
installation of gutters and drains, and building of residential and
commercial structures had prevented rainfall from entering the
327
ground and greatly increased the volume and force of the runoff.
The city, however, had not "diverted" the water by "artificial
channels." Debris was carried onto the plaintiffs property, a deep
gully washed out, and the value of the mill property greatly
depreciated.3 28 Following the best traditions of Sanderson,329 the
supreme court denied relief, holding that, absent negligence,
municipalities are not liable for disturbances of surface drainage
caused by municipal improvements.3 3 0 Although the Pennsylvania
Constitution guarantees compensation by municipal corporations
33 1
for the "taking or injury" of private property for a public purpose,
the court ruled that the "constitutional provision with reference to
325. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 1081-1101, 1371-1375, 1671-1681,
2501-2510, 3181-3195 (Purdon 1974) (general municipal law). Specific provisions are
also contained in the First Class City Code, id. §§ 12101-21714, the Second Class City
Code, id. §§ 22101-26116, the Third Class City Code, id. §§ 30101-30795, the Borough
Code, id. §§ 45101-48501, the First Class Township Code, id. §§ 55101-58502, and the
Second Class Township Code, id. §§ 65101-67201.
326. See notes 143-145 and accompanying text supra.
327. 215 Pa. at 97, 63 A. at 1073.
328. Id.
329. See notes 139-142 and accompanying text supra.
330. 215 Pa. at 98-99, 63 A. at 1073-74. In so holding, the court stated:
Cities are authorized to open, grade and improve streets and the abutting lot
owners may build according to their requirements. In this natural change and
development from agricultural or rural to urban territory some disturbance of the
surface drainage is inevitable, but without negligence the municipality is not
liable for the results. . . . Though a city may be authorized to construct sewers or
an adequate system of drainage it is not bound to do so, nor is it liable for an
erroneous judgment as to what will be adequate.
Id. (citations omitted).

331. PA. CONST. art. 10, § 4.
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property 'injured' in the construction of public works, has made no
change in the principles applicable to this case .... "332 Unless the
municipality was liable pursuant to Pennsylvania drainage rules,
any injury to others was damnum absque injuria.
According to the doctrines derived from Strauss and its progeny,
a local government generally will not be liable for increased runoff
occasioned by the nonnegligent "natural and proper development of
a municipality" 333 or construction of public facilities. 33 1 Yet, a
municipality may not increase the volume of water draining in a
particular direction,3 35 or accumulate and divert runoff from its
natural course and "throw a body of water upon the property of one
of its citizens which would not naturally have flowed there. ' 336 The
distinction between unlawful collection and diversion and lawful
improvement of streets and drains can be very vague.3 3 7 In
addition, a municipality may not obstruct the natural watercourse of
a drainageway which has, through long use, become a prescriptive
easement. 3 3 However, the courts have narrowly confined the
application of the "obstruction of a watercourse" rule to streams
with defined bed and banks. For example, the court in Kunkle v.
332. 215 Pa. at 99, 63 A. at 1074, citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. Marchant, 119 Pa.
541, 13 A. 690 (1888); accord, Stork v. City of Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 101, 45 A. 678
(1900).
333. 215 Pa. at 99, 63 A. at 1073.
334. See Herbein v. Exeter Township School Auth., 48 Berks County L. Rep. 137
(C.P. 1956), aff'g 47 Berks County L. Rep. 289 (C.P. 1955) (school athletic fields and
parking lots accelerated runoff).
335. See Frederick v. Lansdale Borough, 156 Pa. 613, 27 A. 563 (1893). But see
Kunkle v. Ford City Borough, 316 Pa. 571, 574-75, 175 A. 412, 413 (1934) (suggestion
in dicta that municipality would be permitted to enlarge area of watershed or change
flow of surface water as a consequence of gradual and ordinary development).

336. Torrey v. City of Scranton, 133 Pa. 173, 180, 19 A. 351, 351 (1890); accord,
Mitchell v. City of New Castle, 275 Pa. 426, 119 A. 485 (1923) (obstruction of drainage
flowing down street onto plaintiff's land); Elliott v. Oil City, 129 Pa. 570, 18 A. 553
(1889) (increased runoff from hillside channeled through culvert under road);
Huddleston v. Borough of West Bellevue, 111 Pa. 110,.2 A. 200 (1885) (gutter adjoining
road collected water and bypassed natural drains to river until it was apt to become a
destructive flood); Menninchino v. City of New Castle, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 405 (1929)
(city erected barrier against water flowing down steep street, diverting runoff onto
plaintiffs land); Rohrer v. Harrisburg, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 543 (1902) (city constructed
path across road which dammed up drainage and diverted water onto adjoining land).
337. See Barrett v. Minersville Borough, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 76 (1909) (borough which
installed gutter to carry runoff from street to township line and discharge it onto
plaintiffs land, held not liable even though less water would have flowed onto
plaintiff's lot if no gutter had been constructed).
338. Mitchell v. City of New Castle, 275 Pa. 426, 119 A. 485 (1923); Rohrer v.
Harrisburg, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 543 (1902). But see Lorah v. Amity Township, 35 Pa.
Super. Ct. 529 (1908) (ditch along road for 30 years did not become prescriptive
drainage path for runoff from the highway, as adjoining landowner had no claim to
require its continued use and no adverse possession or use of the channel); Schweriner
v. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 128 (1907) (city held 'not liable in negligence for
drainage from a park improvement, even though a natural watercourse was altered by
the project, where remedy of board of review not followed).
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Ford City Borough,339 relied upon the common enemy rule to uphold
a municipality's right to fill a drainageway between two swamps,
even though it caused water to accumulate on neighboring lands.
The court found that the path only discharged diffused drainage
during heavy rains and was not a "stream;" thus the municipality
340
was empowered to obstruct the runoff from higher lands.
While municipalities are not liable for nonnegligent alterations
in drainage patterns due to public improvements, a question arises
as to the extent of local government responsibility for "negligent"
acts in conjunction with such projects. Early cases created a curious
distinction between negligence in the design of public improvements
and negligence in their execution. This dichotomy resulted in part
from a pattern of procedural ping-pong developed in litigation
against local governments.
Typically, if a citizen sued in trespass and complained that
damages resulted from negligent design of a municipal facility for
failing to provide for drainage, the courts ruled that the government
had no obligation to grade streets, install gutters, or provide for
storm runoff.341 Since selection of the optimal plan of public

improvement is a matter of municipal discretion, negligence in
design was not cognizable. 34

2

If the damage arose as a direct and

necessary consequence of the plan selected, the proper and exclusive
remedy was to request appointment of a board of review and demand
343
compensation under the eminent domain laws.
If landowners sued for eminent domain relief, however, they
faced the rule of Strauss which limited recovery to collection and
diversion of surface waters or negligent alteration of drainage. 344 In
order to recover, the claim for consequential drainage damage had to
be asserted at the time of the original taking, quite probably before
major storm water problems were observed and assessed. Moreover,
only direct, immediate, and unavoidable consequences of a public
project could be redressed through eminent domain; injuries caused
by negligent performance of the authorized work had to be remedied

339. 316 Pa. 571, 175 A. 412 (1934). See Kunkle v. Ford City Borough, 305 Pa. 416,

158 A. 159 (1932).
340. 316 Pa. at 576, 175 A. at 161. But see Burdsall v. Lansdowne Borough, 68 Pa.
Super. Ct. 215 (1917) (damages for accumulations of water resulting from public works
may be awarded even where there was "no change or diversion of the watershed").
341. See, e.g., Schweriner v. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 128 (1907).
342. See id. at 131.
343. See Robinson v. Norwood Borough, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 481 (1905), aff'd, 215 Pa.
375, 64 A. 539 (1906); Cooper v. Scranton City, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 17, 19-20 (1902);
Hoster v. City of Philadelphia, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 224 (1899).
344. For a discussion of the Strauss rule, see notes 143-145, 326-332 and
accompanying text supra.
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by a tort action in trespass. 3 5 The possibility of adopting a different
plan that would not injure the complaining parties was not a ground
for finding that the damages were avoidable. Plaintiffs were
continuously confronted with the difficult task of determining the
cause of their injury: Was it a natural consequence of the plan or a
result of negligent performance? The dividing line between negligent
design and negligent construction was often unclear. 346 Frequently
the
the harm stemmed from the operation of both factors, and in 347
denied.
often
were
claims
both
litigation
multiple
of
confusion
The usual consequence of these procedural intricacies and
doctrinal gymnastics was denial of relief where municipal projects
created storm water problems. Only when a local government
collected and diverted water, or was clearly negligent in maintaining
or constructing a project, would it be held liable. The Pennsylvania
cases, however, deny the existence of any duty to take reasonable
care in planning public improvements in order to avoid damages to
private property and erect monumental barriers to recovery for the
negligent design of municipal projects. With the abolition of
governmental immunity to suits for tortious conduct, 348 it is
questionable whether such arbitrary doctrines and distinctions
should still prevail.
Further complications are present when two municipalities are
involved in projects that create or exacerbate a drainage problem. If
one municipality blocks drainage entering from a neighboring
township, causing it to flood a private citizen's land, the upslope
municipality will not be held responsible unless it has consented to
the diversion. 349 If the upslope community collects and discharges
water into an adjoining municipality which receives it without
objection, the lower municipality accepts responsibility for correctly
disposing of the drainage flow and the originating community is
relieved of responsibility. 35° However, where both municipalities
engage in improvements that accelerate and divert runoff, they may
be considered joint and several tortfeasors, collectively and individually responsible to provide compensation. 351 Application of these
345. Chatham St., 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 103, 108-09 (1901).
346. Compare Barrett v. Minersville Borough, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 76, 81 (1909), with
Allentown v. Kramer, 73 Pa. 406, 409 (1873).
347. See, e.g., Hoster v. City of Philadelphia, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 224 (1899) (evidence
of water damage excluded in eminent domain action and negligence suit dismissed
because damages should have been assessed in eminent domain proceeding).
348. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1974); see
notes 371-374 and accompanying text infra.
349. Mitchell v. City of New Castle, 275 Pa. 426, 430, 119 A. 485, 486 (1923).

350. Robino v. North Sewickley Township, 48 Pa. 'Super Ct. 68, 72 (1911).
351. See Huddleston v. Borough of West Bellevue, 111 Pa. 110, 123, 2 A. 200, 204
(1885).
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principles to modern cases could generate a litigious morass, as
several municipalities in a watershed, all engaged in drainage

alteration, debate over who contributed to or acquiesced in
exacerbation of runoff problems and flooding damage to landowners
throughout the basin.
B.

Municipal Responsibility for Storm Water Drainage Systems

A number of statutes authorize counties, cities, boroughs, and
townships to design, install and maintain storm sewer, drainage and

flood control works. 352 Although these laws were drafted at various
times and utilize differing language, they generally allow municipalities to expend funds to lay out drains, acquire necessary lands by
purchase or eminent domain, engage in stream clearance projects,
install storm sewers, channels, levees and dikes, and operate such
works. The question thus arises as to what responsibilities a

municipality has in the design, construction, and maintenance of
storm drainage systems.
53
This issue arose as early as 1860 in Carr v. Northern Liberties.1
The community had constructed a culvert during the years 1830 to

1832 to drain its lands. Although adequate when originally installed,
the culvert was rendered entirely inadequate because of subsequent
development. 35 4 As a result, a dry goods store and adjacent lands
were repeatedly flooded by backwater from the drain inlets. 355 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the municipality had
no obligation to construct adequate sewers to serve the town's

drainage needs. 356 Therefore, since the authority to provide storm
sewers was discretionary, the court held that no legal duty could be
imposed upon the community. 35 7 The court further suggested that, in

352. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1947, 5147 (Purdon 1956 & Supp. 1975) (counties
authorized to engage in stream improvements and storm water drainage projects); id.
tit. 53, §§ 2201-2361 (Purdon 1974) (installation of sewers and drains); id. §2862
(Purdon 1974) (municipal flood control works); id. § 12263 (Purdon 1957) (first class
city drainage authority, superceded by Home Rule Charter); id. §§ 23139, 23169
(Purdon 1957) (second class city power to establish and change watercourse and
construct flood control works); id. §§ 37403(14), 37801, 38001, 38401 (Purdon 1957)
(third class city power to alter watercourses and construct flood control works and
drains); id. §§46801-46802, 47201-47204 (Purdon 1959) (borough powers); id.
§§ 57401-57445 (Supp. 1975) (first class township powers); id. §§ 66501-66545 (Purdon
1957 & Supp. 1975) (second class township powers); id. tit. 32, §§653-74, 701-06
(Purdon 1967) (state and local cooperation in flood and stream improvement projects).
353. 35 Pa. 324 (1860).
354. Id. at 325.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 328, 330.
357. Id. at 330. It should be noted that all current statutory provisions authorizing
municipal flood control and drainage projects, like the statutory authority cited in
Carr, are written as nonmandatory powers. See note 352 supra.
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deference to the discretionary power of the town council, the
negligent performance of the council's authority in laying out and
constructing drains would also be nonactionable. 358 Subsequent
cases consistently held that no duty could be imposed upon a
municipality to design and construct adequate storm drains, 35 9 nor
to exercise "the best" engineering judgment to select a drainage plan
which would minimize injury to its citizens. 36° These decisions rest in
part, if not primarily, upon the fundamental premise of governmental immunity: that local governments may not be held liable for
tortious conduct in the performance of "discretionary" or "governmental" powers, as opposed to "ministerial" or "proprietary"
36 1
authority.
Before the abandonment of the governmental immunity doctrine,362 the Pennsylvania drainage cases developed a checkerboard
of distinctions and exceptions to that doctrine. For example, while a
358. Id. at 329. In reaching the conclusion that no action would lie for the council's
negligence in storm water management, the court noted:
[T]here must be many evils, and even many wrongs, for which there can be no
remedy. . . . [Public] officers are sure to make mistakes, and sometimes to cause
great damage to individuals; yet the people cannot be made answerable for this
before the courts, except only in some special cases ...
Municipal corporations have often been held liable for carelessness in the
exercise of their functions; but if we undertake to correct the.evil in such a case as
this, on the ground of carelessness, we see not how to escape from the necessity of
submitting the propriety of all acts of grading and draining in our towns, to the
decision of juries; for even discretionary acts may be charged to have been
ignorantly or carelessly resolved upon.
Id.
359. E.g., Aron v. Philadelphia, 310 Pa. 84, 164 A. 777 (1933); Collins v. City of
Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 272 (1880); Fair v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 309 (1879); Diklich
v. Johnstown, 118 Pa. Super. Ct. 283, 180 A. 41 (1935); Herr v. Altoona, 31 Pa. Super.
Ct. 375 (1906). In Aron, the court stated: "It is well established that there is no liability
on the part of a municipal corporation for the flooding of private property from the
mere inadequacy of gutters, drains, culverts or sewers." 310 Pa. at 90, 164 A. at 779.
Similarly, in Fair, the court held that the expansion of an artificial sewer which
overtaxed the capacity of the existing sewer was nonactionable, noting: "So long as it
is the mere omission, as here, of the authorities, to provide adequate means to carry
off the water which storms, and the natural formation of the ground, throw on a lot,
the owner thereof cannot sustain an action against the municipality." 88 Pa. at 311.
360. Diklich v. Johnstown, 118 Pa. Super. Ct. 283, 180 A. 41 (1935); Schroeder v.
Borough of Mechanicsburg, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 532, 537 (1920). The superior court in
Schroeder noted: "[A municipality] might be called upon to answer for negligence in
the actual work of construction, or for failure to keep the work in repair after it is
completed, but not for lack of judgment in the selection of a plan." Id.
361. See Phillips, Legal Position of Local Units of Government in Pennsylvania,
13 TEMP. L.Q. 466 (1939); Schulz, The Liability of Municipal Corporationsfor Torts in
Pennsylvania, 40 DICK. L. REV. 137 (1936); Sherman, Torts, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 372,
386 (1958); Note, Municipal Tort Liability in Pennsylvania - Checkered Immunity,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 92 (1951).
362. In 1973, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of
governmental immunity with respect to local governments in the Commonwealth.
Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). See notes
371-374 and accompanying text infra.
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municipality would not be liable for the design of inadequate sewers,
it could be held legally accountable for the installation of an
inadequate culvert or sewer which obstructed the flow of a "live,
natural stream" having well-defined banks and bed .3 63 A watercourse which a municipality enclosed in a storm drainage structure
had to be reasonably designed to carry the flow of the stream, even
in times of "ordinary flood.:3 4 Similarly, a municipality was held
liable for artificial collection and discharge of surface runoff "in a
body" upon private land;3 65 negligent construction of drainage
systems contrary to plans or in an unworkmanlike fashion; 366 and
negligent failure to inspect, maintain and remove debris from storm
sewers, culverts and other water structures. 3 67 Indeed, one case
suggested that there was a "line of demarcation between discretionary and mandatory construction of drainage systems by a municipality . . . determined by the volume of flow and discharge of
surface water in each instance.36s Where, for example, surface water
flows in a large volume over a highway so as to endanger travelers,
the city may be charged with negligence in failing to provide proper
drainage. :6" However, existence of a set of conditions which would
give rise to a municipal duty to install drainage systems was
exceedingly rare. 7:" "
In 1973, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally abolished the
doctrine of governmental immunity as applied to local govern363. See Lang v. Punxsutawney Borough, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 171, 176 (1910)
(Morrison, J., concurring); Metzgar v. Lycoming Township, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 602,
607-10 (1909); Gift v. City of Reading, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 359 (1897).
.364. See Lang v. Punxsutawney Borough, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 171, 176 (1910)
(Morrison, J., concurring); Metzgar v. Lycoming Township, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 602,
607-10 (1909).
365. Morton v. Dormont Borough, 334 Pa. 283, 5 A.2d 803 (1939); Weir v. Plymouth
Borough, 148 Pa. 566, 24 A. 94 (1892); see notes 146-61 and accompanying text supra.
:366. Vanderslice v. City of Philadelphia, 103 Pa. 102 (1883) (sewer allegedly
improperly cradled and supported, and negligently maintained); Gift v. City of
Reading, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 359, 364 (1897). In Gift the court commented: "[T]he work of
construction in accordance with adopted plans is purely ministerial; it must, therefore,
like all ministerial duties, be performed in a skillful and careful manner; and the
municipality is liable for injuries caused by its negligent performance." Id. at 364.
367. Morton v. Ambridge Borough, 375 Pa. 630, 101 A.2d 661 (1954); Vanderslice v.
City of Philadelphia, 103 Pa. 102, 107 (1883); Land v. Punxsutawney Borough, 44 Pa.
Super. Ct. 171, 175-76 (1910).
368. Strauch v. Scranton, 157 Pa. Super. Ct. 174, 178, 42 A.2d 96, 98, aff'd per
curiam, 353 Pa. 10, 44 A.2d 258 (1945).
369. See McCracken v. Curwensville Borough, 309 Pa. 98, 104, 163 A. 217, 219
(1932).
370. McCracken v. Curwensville Borough, 309 Pa. 98, 163 A. 217 (1932); Strauch v.
Scranton, 157 Pa. Super Ct. 174, 178-79 (1945), discussing, McDonough v. Munhall
Borough, 331 Pa. 468, 200 A. 638 (1938); Coleman v. City of Scranton, 99 Pa. Super. Ct.
3 (1930). It should be noted that each of these cases involved the city's duty to provide
drainage in order to avoid ice accumulations which endangered pedestrians and
vehicular travel.
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ments.371 Thus, the prior distinctions between "discretionary" and
"ministerial" duties, and between "governmental" and "proprietary"
powers, are no longer effective. The court's guiding statements, in
sharp contrast to the views expressed in Carr v. Northern
Liberties,:7' 2 reveal the general attitude of the judiciary in approaching modern municipal tort cases:
Recently, this Court reiterated the prevailing philosophy
that liability follows tortious conduct. .

.

. [W]e said: "It is

fundamental to our common law system that one may seek
redress for every substantial wrong. The best statement of the
rule is that a wrongdoer is responsible for the natural and
proximate consequences of his misconduct."

73

In deciding to apply this rule to governmental bodies the court
noted:
Appellee offers no reason - and we are unable to discern
one - for permitting governmental units to escape the effect of
this fundamental principle.
"As we have stated many times before, today cities and
states are active and virile creatures capable of inflicting great
harm, and their civil liability should be co-extensive. Even
though a governmental entity does not profit from its projects,
the taxpaying public nevertheless does, and it is the taxpaying
public which should pay for governmental maladministration. If
the city operates or maintains injury-inducing activities or
conditions, the harm thus caused should be viewed as a part of
the normal and proper costs of public administration and not as
a diversion of public funds. The city is a far better loss3 74
distributing agency than the innocent and injured victim."
Whether this change in the judicial attitude toward the
immunity doctrine portends a major overhaul of laws applicable to
municipal drainage and storm water activities remains an open
question. Although municipalities have long been shielded from
liability for failing to control accelerated runoff engendered by
"natural and ordinary" urban development, per se immunity has
371. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd, of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
Prior to the decision in Ayala, municipal corporations and quasi-corporations, such as
school districts, were not liable for the tortious conduct of their employees. Id. at 590,
305 A.2d at 880.
372. 35 Pa. 324 (1860). See notes 353-358 and accompanying text supra.
373. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 594-95, 305 A.2d 877,
882 (1973), quoting Neiderman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 403, 261 A.2d 84, 85 (1970).
374. 453 Pa. 584, 594-95, 305 A.2d 877, 882 (1973), quoting Comment, 32 AM. TRIAL
LAw. J. 284, 288 (1968).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss5/1

54

Weston: Gone with the Water - Drainage Rights and Storm Water Management

1976-1977]

PENNSYLVANIA

WATER MANAGEMENT

now been stripped away. Negligence in the design of drainage
structures - failure to exercise reasonable care in engineering storm
water systems of adequate capacity to avoid unnecessary injury can no longer be distinguished from negligent construction and
maintenance. If a municipality negligently adopts and implements a
drainage plan, it may be legally responsible for resulting injuries.
But what if it simply does nothing, allowing the expansion of private
development, streets, and other activities to drastically alter runoff
quantities and velocities and create or exacerbate flooding conditions? Negligence consists of failure to use reasonable care in
3 75
performing, or failing to perform, a duty owed to the party injured.
Yet, current Pennsylvania statutes authorizing municipal storm
water management projects 376 still do not explicitly impose a duty to
install such systems or control runoff where necessary to avert
public and private injury. Unless the courts overturn 199 years of
precedent and reinterpret these statutory provisions to impose an
implied duty upon municipalities to avoid and abate "injury37 8
inducing . . .conditions" 377 created by municipal development,
major reform in this area of drainage law must await the action of
the General Assembly.
C.

Municipal Responsibility in Reviewing Drainage Provisions of
Development Plans

The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (Planning
Code) 379 authorizes municipalities to prepare and adopt "comprehensive plans" for community development, 3s° zoning ordinances, :"' and
2
subdivision and land development ordinances and regulations1
When a local government body fails to formulate such development
plans and ordinances, the county is empowered to prepare and
3 13
enforce zoning and subdivision controls until the local unit acts.
Neither municipal nor county governments are required to enact
land use plans and controls; exercise of their regulatory development
powers is optional. 3 4 If exercised, however, the Planning Code
375. See note 165 supra.
376. See note 352 supra.

377. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 594, 305 A.2d 877, 882
(1973).
378. See Briener v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 536 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'g in
part 398 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (borough held not liable for negiligent
enforcement of subdivision ordinance and approval of development plan without
adequate drainage provisions).
379. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972).
380. Id. §§ 10301-10306.
381. Id. §§ 10601-10619.
382. Id. §§ 10501-10515.
383. Id. §§ 10502, 10602.
384. Id. § 10301.
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prescribes certain minimum criteria for municipal plans and
ordinances which must be satisfied. Moreover, the common law may

impose particular duties upon the adopting and administering
agencies.
Comprehensive plan requirements for storm water management
are vaguely defined in the Planning Code. Each comprehensive plan

must contain "[a] plan for community facilities and utilities, which
may include ... storm drainage. ' 38 5 Thus, it appears that drainage
regulation is but an optional element of municipal comprehensive
plans. Moreover, the effect of county and municipal comprehensive
plans is, at most, that of advisory guidelines. After adoption of a
plan, the Planning Code merely requires that certain municipal
actions be submitted to the local planning agency for comment and
a "specific statement as to whether or not the proposed action is in
accordance with the intent of the formally adopted comprehensive
38 7
plan. ' 386 Since a comprehensive plan has no compulsory effect,
the adoption of a zoning or subdivision ordinance or the approval of
a subdivision development plan need not conform to the comprehen sive plan guidelines.
The provisions of the Planning Code relating to subdivision
ordinances are more specific but not necessarily obligatory.38 8 When
a subdivision ordinance is adopted, however, no subdivision or land
development, storm sewer, or other improvement may be laid out or
constructed unless it is conducted pursuant to the ordinance's
requirements.38 9 Municipalities may require that drainage improvements be completed as a condition precedent to approval of the
development, : 11or may mandate the posting of performance bonds
385. Id. § 10301(4) (emphasis added).
386. Id. § 10303. The adoption of zoning and subdivision ordinances are among
some of the municipal actions which must be presented to the local planning agency
for review. Id.
387. See Saenger v. Planning Comm'n of Berks County, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 499, 308
A.2d 175 (1973) (municipality not required to adhere to county's comprehensive plan).
The Planning Code only. requires zoning ordinances to contain a statement of
"community development objectives" which may be supplied by reference to a
comprehensive plan or such portions of a plan as may exist, or to a statement of
legislative findings and purposes. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10606 (Purdon 1972).
388. Subdivision and land development ordinances may include:
Provisions for ensuring that: (i) the layout or arrangement of the subdivision or
land development shall conform to the comprehensive plan and to any
regulations or maps adopted in furtherance thereof; . . . (iii) adequate easements
or rights-of-way shall be provided for drainage and utilities; .

.

. (v) .

.

. land

which is subject to flooding . . . either shall be made safe for the purpose for
which such land is proposed to be used, or that such land shall be set aside for
uses which shall not endanger life or property or further aggravate or increase the
existing menace.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10503(2) (Purdon 1972).
389. Id. § 10507.
390. Id. §§ 10503(3), 10509.
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or other security to assure their completion. 391 If a municipality or
county adopts a subdivision ordinance and assumes the responsibility for reviewing development plans, two issues arise: 1) the duty to
be imposed upon the community to adopt and administer adequate
storm drainage standards, and 2) the duty to be imposed upon the
municipality to enforce such standards if adopted.
Breiner.v. C & P Home Builders, Inc.,39 2 provides a disappointing and limited answer to the second of these questions. Alburtis
Borough approved a'residential subdivision plan which did not
contain adequate drainage control provisions to prevent flooding of
adjacent properties, 393 despite a borough regulation requiring the
installation of drainage systems upon development.3 9 4 The resulting
uncontrolled runoff severely damaged neighboring farm lands
located across .the borough line in an adjacent township. 395 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court ruling
holding the borough jointly and severally liable with the developer
for damages exceeding $36,000. 396 The court found that the borough
ordinance required that the subdivision plan show artificial
drainage works only if proposed by the developer and permitted the
borough to , demand the installation of drainage systems in its
discretion. 397 Therefore, the court concluded that if the developer did
not propose a "mechanical drainage system" and the borough did
not insist upon drainage facility' installation, submission of a
drainage plan. was not mandated by the ordinance, and approval of
the subdivision plan without drainage details did not violate the
3 98
borough's ordinance.
MGre surprising was the court's suggestion that, even if the
borough had flagrantly violated its own ordinance by failing to
391. Id. § 10509.
392. 536 F.2d 27 (3d' Cir. 1976), aff'g in part 398 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
393. 536 F.2d at,29. The approval of the plan was contrary to the recommendation
of the municipal engineer. Id.
394. Alburtis Borough, Pa., Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance, Art.
VI, § 4 (Feb. 1, 1960), quoted in Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 250,
256-57 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The regulations mandate that:
All storm drains and drainage facilities such as gutters, inlets, bridges, storm
sewers and culverts as may be required by the Borough, shall be installed by the
developer and the land graded for adequate drainage. Street grades shall be such
that no surface drainage is discharged over lots; where topographic conditions
require that drainage ways other than streets or alleys must be employed,
prepared easements shall be provided over them.
All details of drainage systems shall be shown on the Final Plan, or by means
of an accompanying Drainage Plan.
Alburtis Borough Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance, Art. VI, § 4 (Feb. 1,
1960).
395. 536 F.2d at 29.
396. Id. at 34.
397. Id. at 32.
398. Id.
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require adequate drainage, it would have owed no duty to injured
landowners lying outside its municipal boundaries. 399 Essentially,
the court ruled 1) that the ordinance was intended to benefit directly
the borough's residents and property, and not to protect landowners
outside the municipality; 2) that the ordinance imposed no duty on
the borough to protect land in adjacent areas from surface water
drainage; and 3) that, while the borough's officers and employees
were compelled to exercise due care in approving subdivision plans,
they were under no obligation to review the final plan for potential
adverse effects on areas outside the municipal limits.
The Third Circuit's decision appears contrary to the major policy
consideration that influenced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
abrogate the doctrine of municipal immunity: the sobering effect
that such an imposed duty would have on municipalities and their
officers. 400 The decision stands as an open invitation to city, borough
and township officers to disregard the negative drainage effects of
development and accelerated storm water upon adjacent communities, which have no political voice in the decisions affecting their
lands and no legal recourse against a callous disregard of their
interests. With neither political nor legal accountability, careful
review of drainage plans by municipalities is likely to remain a
chimerical vision.
For the future, Pennsylvania must seriously address the issue of
whether, and under what circumstances, a municipality has a duty
to adopt and enforce drainage standards to protect landowners from
accelerated runoff. The duty to adopt and the obligation to enforce
adequate drainage rules cannot be separated. It would be folly
merely to impose an enforcement duty upon those communities that
adopt drainage standards without also obligating all municipalities
to develop drainage regulations.401 On the one hand, courts may be
399. Id.

400. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 599, 305 A.2d 877,

884 (1973), where the court stated: "[Wihere governmental immunity has had the
effect of encouraging laxness and a disregard of potential harm, exposure of the
government to liability for its torts will have the effect of increasing governmental
care and concern for the welfare of those who might be injured by its actions." Id.,
quoting Note, The Discretionary Exception and Municipal Tort Liability: A
Reappraisal, 52 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1057 (1968).
401. The district court in Breiner, however, suggested the contrary:
[A] duty [to enforce subdivision drainage regulations] does not impose a heavy
burden on municipalities and their officers, but merely clarifies a function that
most already carry out. This Court is not requiring the Borough to order the
construction of, or itself construct, a drainage system for each subdivision, but
rather is saying that the Borough should withhold approval of a subdivision plan
until such time as it complies with all the provisions of its land subdivision
ordinance, a duty easily complied with.
398 F. Supp. at 256.
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reluctant to order governing municipal bodies to exercise their
legislative discretion in a particular manner. Yet, if municipalities
could evade liability for negligent approval of subdivision plans
merely by refusing to adopt, or by repealing, drainage regulations,
communities would have a strong incentive to avoid promulgating
needed storm water management codes lest they be held liable for
negligent enforcement. Not only would the path of inaction be safest,
but also, any attempt to regulate would result in potential municipal
malpractice. Until the courts or legislature clearly impose a duty
upon local governments to review and approve drainage plans in
accordance with reasonable storm water management practice, there
will be every reason for municipalities to display less rather than
more governmental concern for the welfare of those who might be
injured by poorly planned land development.
D. Some Exemplary Municipal Programs
In the face of significant and conflicting pressures, several
Pennsylvania municipalities have adopted storm drainage programs
worthy of special comment. In this article, there is insufficient space
to discuss each of the meritorious local programs previously enacted
or now under consideration. Instead, this section will concentrate on
a few county and municipal activities which exemplify the options
available to Pennsylvania local governments.
1. Philadelphia-Wissahickon Watershed Development Regulations
The Wissahickon watershed within Philadelphia comprises an
area of eleven square miles with a unique combination of urban and
natural assets. 40 2 Recognizing the need to preserve these assets while
preparing for new development, the City of Philadelphia undertook
an intensive study of the watershed in 1972, drawing upon the
expertise of consultants and a task force of local citizens and city
and state officials to shape recommendations for action.
The studies of the Wissahickon Creek and its environs
commissioned by the city demonstrated the important interface
40 3
between developmental activities and storm water management. It
should be noted that the Wissahickon may be less sensitive to runoff
problems than many other urbanizing watersheds due to its unique
402.

PHILADELPHIA

CITY PLANNING

COMM'N,

4 (1976) (hereinafter cited

WISSAHICKON

WATERSHED

DE-

as GUIDE). Within the Wissahickon
watershed lie Fairmount Park and the neighborhoods of Germantown, Mount Airy,
VELOPMENT GUIDE

Chestnut Hill, Roxborough, and East Falls. Id.

403. See REGIONAL SCIENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EVIRONMENTAL STUDY OF THE
WISSAHICKON WATERSHED WITHIN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA (1973).
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hydrologic characteristics and the large percentage of dedicated
public open space. Peak discharges at the creek mouth increased
only five to twenty percent from 1900 to 1968.104 This range is
substantially lower than would be expected given the change in land
uses over the period. 40 5 The impacts of urban development on the
smaller tributary streams, however, were shown to be very
significant.40 6 The volume of one-, five-, and ten-year flood dis40
charges were often more than doubled or tripled by urbanization. 1
Armed with this information, the city developed a sophisticated
set of laws, regulations, and policies to guide development in the
watershed. The Philadelphia City Planning Commission explained
the rationale underlying this rulemaking process:
By adopting these controls the City has acknowledged that
storm water runoff, pollution and the visual features of
developed areas all have serious impacts on the quality of
neighborhood parklands, and, conversely, that the environmental stability of open space has profound influence on the quality
40 8
of life in the developed areas of the Watershed.
The Wissahickon

Watershed Ordinance, 409 adopted in

1975,

mandates compliance with environmental standards which: 1)
require the formulation of earth moving plans and erosion controls;
2) impose limitations on the extent of impervious ground cover; 3)
control construction on steep slopes; and 4) require setbacks from
water courses. 410 Each of these elements has a major impact on
storm water control.
The lands within the Wissahickon Valley have been classified
and mapped on a five-acre grid basis according to the capacity of
tributary stream channels and runoff characteristics.411 For each

area, a limit on permissible impervious ground cover is established,
ranging from twenty to forty-five percent. 412 One category has no
maximum coverage limit, thereby allowing parcels in excess of onehalf acre to be developed provided that the increased runoff from the
site does not adversely affect adjacent property, the method of
handling runoff is in accordance with sound engineering practice
404. Id. at 59.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 61.
407. See id. at 72 (table 9).
408. GUIDE, supra, note 402, at 4.
409. PHILADELPHIA CODE § 14-1603 (1975).
410. Id. § 14-603(4).
411. Id. § 14-603(4)(c) (Map B). Runoff characteristics include geologic, topographic, and hydrologic considerations.
412. Id. § 14-1603(4)(c)(1).
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and prevents significant accelerated erosion, and the infiltration
capacity of the site is not significantly diminished."4 3 If countermeasures are taken to ensure that "storm water leaving the property
shall be substantially similar in effect to *that under the basic
impervious coverage limitation,"4' 1 4 developers will be permitted to
install impervious surfaces to a greater degree than permitted under
the basic coverage rules. Countermeasures that may warrant
waiving the application of the basic coverage rules include: use of
pervious paving materials, such as lattice blocks or porous asphalt;
installation of seepage pits, dutch drains, and similar infiltration
structures; and utilization of detention basins and structures to
control the peak flow and velocity of runoff. 41 5 Specific performance

standards and design criteria, which are established in the
Philadelphia City Planning Commission Regulations (Regulations),416 Were derived on the basis of controlling runoff from rainfall
events having a two-hour duration and a recurrence interval of
twenty-five years. 4 17 Where detention. basins, however, are unable to
discharge directly into a stream, they must be capable of retaining a
two-hour, fifty-year storm. 418 It should be noted that the selection of
the design storm to be used as the model must be at least partially
based upon the watershed in question. in a small watershed such as
the Wissahickon and its tributaries, a short-duration, flash-flood
storm -

such as a two-hour, twenty-five-year event -

may be far

more critical than longer rainfall events - such as a twenty-fourhour, twenty-five- or fifty-year storm. 419
In addition to accelerated runoff control, the Philadelphia
program provides standards to be observed to prevent accelerated
erosion and sedimentation resulting from earth moving and
development. The areal extent of land disturbed by earth moving
must be minimized 420 and surface water must be diverted from the
exposed project area. 42 1 Stabilization of slopes, channels, ditches,
and disturbed areas is mandated. 422 In-order to avoid high velocity
flows and scouring of disturbed land, minimum capacities for
413. Id. (category 5).
414. Id. § 14-1603(4)(c)(2)(a).
415. PHILADELPHIA CITY PLANNING
VELOPMENT REGULATIONS, § I.C.

COMM'N,

WISSAHICKON

(1975) [hereinafter cited

WATERSHED

DE-

as REGULATIONS].

416. Id.

-

417. Id. §I.C.4.a.
418. Id. § I.C.4.e.
419. See R. KERR, D. McGINNIS, B. REICH & T. RACHFORD, ANALYSIS OF RAINFALL
DURATION - FREQUENCY FOR PENNSYLVANIA 122 (Pa. State University, Institute

for Research on Land & Water Resources, Research Pub. No. 65, 1970).

420. REGULATIONS, supra note 415, § II.D.2.a.
421. Id. §II.D.2.b.
422. Id. § II.D.2.d-e.
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diversion terraces and channels 23 and maximum flow velocities 424
are established. In addition, design standards for sediment basins,
to allow settling of silt from runoff, are set forth in the Regulations. 425 A permit for earth moving activities is required except in
those cases where 1) the activities involve plowing or tilling for
agricultural purposes; 2) an erosion plan has been developed for the
activity by the Soil Conservation Service of the United States
Department of Agriculture (SCS); 3) the activity is necessary in order
to receive certain state or federal permits; 4) the site is one-half acre
or less in area; or 5) the earth moved or impervious cover will be less
than 500 square feet.426 However, even if an earth moving permit is

not required, the performance standards for erosion and runoff
427
control remain in effect.
Philadelphia's sophisticated approach to the Wissahickon
watershed contains many commendable features. It provides
performance standards that developers and engineers can follow in
preparing site plans, and includes suggestions for practical storm
drainage provisions that can be incorporated into minor as well as
major land developments. Perhaps most importantly, Philadelphia's
program directly addresses each of the interrelated aspects of the
storm water management problem: impervious surfaces, land slopes,
increased volumes of runoff, accelerated velocities of runoff, erosion,
and sedimentation.
The Wissahickon approach, however requires a complex
watershed analysis in order to establish maximum impervious
surface standards which would avoid overburdening stream channel
capacity. 428 A plan modeled after the Wissahickon is more difficult
both to prepare and implement than one similar to the plan
formulated by Chester and Bucks Counties, which establishes a noincrease-in-peak-runoff criteria for all developments. 429 In some
areas, unlike the Wissahickon watershed, tributary stream channels
may not have sufficient excess capacity to absorb the accelerated
runoff even from a limited amount of new impervious surfaces.
423. Id. § II.D.3.a.1. These minimum capacities are set at 1.6 cubic feet per second
per acre for temporary facilities and 2.75 cubic feet per second for permanent
diversions. Id.
424. Id. §§ II.D.2.c., II.D.3.a.3., II.D.3.b.3., II.D.3.c.1. The maximum flow velocities
are established at 1.5 feet per second for channels and 3.0 feet per second for outlet
structures. Id.
425. Id. § II.D.3.d.
426. Id. § II.F.l.a.
427. Id. § II.F.l.b.
428. D. DAHLEM & F. SCHWARTZ, REGIONAL STANDARDS AND CRITERIA FOR
STORMWATER MANAGEMENT 2 (Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission
Technical Report No. 11, 1974) [hereinafter cited as DVRPC REGIONAL STANDARDS].
429. See notes 431-446 and accompanying text infra.
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Moreover, because of the demand for intensive land use, a low level
of impermeable surface cover may be difficult to achieve in many
urban areas. 430 Thus, the Wissahickon concept must be adapted with
care only to those areas which, after extensive analysis, are shown
to be amenable to such an approach.
2. Bucks County and Chester County Programs
The basic concept of the programs recommended by the
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission (DVRPC) and
adopted by various communities in Bucks and Chester Counties is
simple: the peak discharge of runoff after development for the design
storm should be no more than the peak flow before the development
was undertaken. 431

Each development should be planned, and

drainage facilities designed, to limit peak flows to natural or
preexisting conditions. 432 This approach was initially adopted by the
Chester County Soil and Water Conservation District and promoted
on a voluntary basis with the cooperation of local landowners and
developers.4 33 Subsequently, with the assistance and encouragement
of county and regional planning agencies, 434 a number of Bucks and
Chester County communities adopted "zero excess discharge"
performance standards as part of their zoning or subdivision
ordinances.

435

430. DVRPC REGIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 428, at 2.
431. DVRPC REGIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 428.
432. Id. at 21-22.
433. Id. at 1-2.
434. Particularly active were the Bucks County Planning Commission's Division
of Natural Resources, the Chester County Planning Commission, and the Conservation Districts of both counties. These agencies conducted educational programs,
helped draft ordinances, and waged an active lobbying campaign, all in an effort to
promote the adoption of zero excess discharge statutes.
435. See, e.g., Quakertown Area Zoning Ordinance § 504(8) (adopted jointly by
Milford Township, Haycock Township, and Trumbauersville Borough in 1975). This
ordinance provides as follows:
Storm water: All developments shall limit the rate of storm water run-off so that
the rate of run-off generated is no more than that of the site in its natural
condition. Where farm field or disturbed earth is the existing condition, meadow
shall be used as the starting base for such calculations instead of the actual
condition. All run-off calculations shall be based on 100 year, 24-hour storms. The
method for such calculations shall be that contained in United States Department
of Agriculture, Soils Conservation "Engineering Field Manual, Notice #4" of April
30, 1971, as amended.
A development shall not be required to meet the above provisions if it meets
all of the following criteria:
(a) It lies within a borough which has storm sewer connections to the site.
(b) The site area is 2 acres or less.
(c) The impervious surface ration of the developed site is no greater than .20
in suburban districts, .30 in urban districts, and .80 in nonresidential
districts.
Id. (emphasis in original). Similar provisions have been adopted by Buckingham
Township, Wrightstown Township, Langhorne Manor Borough, Hulmeville Borough,
New Britain Township, Riegelsville Borough, and Springfield Township.
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The DVRPC has set forth the advantages of the zero excess peak
discharge approach:
1. The criterion is easy to apply. Enforcement [by municipalities] would require only that peak discharge before and after
development be determined and facilities designed to limit the
peak. This would be a performance standard with the means of
meeting the criteria up to the developer, regardless of the type of
cover.
2. The criterion is fair. All developers would be treated with
equal stringency. There would be no need to justify different
standards for different areas.
3.

The criterion has a sound legal basis

....

It makes

individuals liable for actions which have historically contributed
to, loss of life and property damage.
4. The criterion is meaningful and cost effective. It is well
established that the natural stream regimen is the most stable
condition and that alterations in flow, channel size and channel
lining will in general be detrimental to some degree. Countermeasures such as channellizing, piping, levees, etc., are likely to
be more costly than limiting discharge to before development
levels. Small incremental effects of individual developments
cannot be ignored since the cumulative effect of numerous
developments in a watershed has often caused severe flooding
problems. The main attraction of the zero discharge concept is
that the facilities necessary to limit peaks - usually retention
basins, recharge pits and pervious infiltration areas - are
minimal in cost compared to after-the-fact remedial measures. 436
Two critical issues, however, arise in applying a zero excess
discharge standard: selection of a design storm upon which to base
the pre- and post-development runoff calculations, and selection and
design of drainage countermeasures to control peak flows.
With respect to the former issue, most of the Bucks County
communities have selected the twenty-four-hour, one hundred-year
storm as a basis for designing runoff controls, primarily from a
desire to ensure that the one hundred-year flood plain area is not
expanded downstream by accelerated runoff from impervious
surfaces. 437 Federal flood insurance requirements and local flood
plain management ordinances are drafted to restrict damage-prone
436. DVRPC REGIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 428, at 21-22.
437. Interview with George Coller, Dist. Conservationist, Bucks County Soil &
Water Conservation Dist. (May 20, 1976).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss5/1

64

Weston: Gone with the Water - Drainage Rights and Storm Water Management

1976-19771

PENNSYLVANIA WATER MANAGEMENT

development in areas inundated by a one hundred-year flood. 438 The

argument supporting the Chester and Bucks County runoff standards is that all future development should be designed to preclude
expansion of both peak flows during a major flood and the flood
plain area which must be regulated.
Use of the one hundred-year storm does not mean a one hundredyear flood is curtailed. Flood levels are determined by a number of
factors, including storm rainfall and duration, slopes, soil types and
saturation conditions, and preexisting stream flows. A one hundredyear flood may be produced by a less intensive storm than a one
hundred-year event which falls on saturated soil in times of
relatively high stream flow. 439 The peak runoff of twenty-four-hour,

.one hundred-year storm and a two-hour, fifty-year storm in eastern
Pennsylvania have, in fact, been calculated to be nearly identical. 440
Some studies indicate that installing impervious surfaces has
far less impact upon peak runoff from large storms than upon runoff
from smaller but more frequent events. Large storms, such as
Hurricane Agnes, tend to saturate the soil so that. over ninety
percent of the rainfall will run off.44 1 The saturated soil in a large

storm reacts much like a roof, pavement, or other artificially created
impervious surfaces, and thus the "natural condition" peak runoff
and "post-development" drainage flow may not be drastically
different. By contrast, urbanization may double or triple runoff
during less intense five-, ten-, and twenty-five-year events.4 42 In
terms of reducing downstream damage, accelerated runoff controls
that are imposed on land developments may produce greater benefits
if addressed to these more frequent, less intense storms. If less
intense events are used as models to establish the capacity of
retention devices, the runoff of larger storms will also be somewhat
ameliorated by the same structures, provided that all structures are
designed to remain stable under the more severe conditions.
Another potential criticism of the use of large storm criteria to
design runoff controls is the apprehension that only the largest
438. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 1910.3 (1976).
See generally UNITED STATES WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, A UNIFIED NATIONAL
PROGRAM FOR FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT IV-4 to -7, V-5 to -8 (1976).
439. Interview with Vaden R. Butler, Chief, Div. of Dams & Encroachments, Pa.
Dep't of Environmental Resources (Sept. 16, 1976); Interview with George Coller,
supra note 437.
440. Interview with George Coller, supra note 437. A 2-hour, 50-year storm is a
concentrated downpour, while the 24-hour, 100-year storm is less intensive, but has a
longer duration. The peak flow will depend on watershed characteristics which govern
concentration time (the time necessary for water to reach a certain point in the
watershed), including slope, soils, antecedent moisture conditions, and urbanization.
Interview with Vadin R. Butler, supra note 439.
441. Interview with Vadin R. Butler, supra note 439.
442. See note 7 supra.
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storms will be accommodated, thereby leaving the exacerbation of
smaller events - which cause much of the annual flood damage largely unchecked. Some may be led to assume that flood plain
management ordinances and storm drainage controls based upon
the one hundred-year event will eliminate or reduce flood damages.
Unfortunately, curtailing an increase of the one hundred-year flood
level does not necessarily mean that increased damages during
lesser floods will be avoided. Flood plain management regulates
construction in one hundred flood-prone areas, but does not prohibit
all development.44 3 New, as well as preexisting, homes, offices,
farms, and factories will remain in the flood area, subject to damage
from small as well as large floods. Thus, in some watersheds,
controlling accelerated runoff from numerous five-, ten-, and fifteenyear storms may be as, or more, important than addressing the
occasional large flood.
The extent to which activities conducted pursuant to the ChesterBucks County model regulations will deal effectively with drainage problems during smaller storms will depend upon the technical
design of the various countermeasures used to reduce runoff from
developments. For example, if the "natural" runoff from a site is
estimated to be fifty cubic feet per second for a ten-year storm and
one hundred cubic feet per second for a one hundred-year storm,
under the Chester-Bucks County model, a developer might install a
retention pond with an outlet pipe capable of discharging no more
than one hundred cubic feet per second. Although a pipe with this
capacity will control the peak runoff from the development during a
large storm, the outlet could allow a considerable acceleration of
runoff during a ten-year storm before it had any effect. Depending
upon the type of the outlet, its location, the hydraulic "head" needed
to reach its maximum flow, and other factors, the structure may only
partially control the accelerated flow from lesser storms. A retention
structure constructed with a weir spillway or multiple outlets would
be capable of releasing variable flows depending upon the amount
and elevation of water stored in the reservoir. 4 4 Experience with
some developments following the one hundred-year storm criteria
has indicated that downstream flooding during lesser rainfall events

443. See 24 C.F.R. § 1910.3 (1976) (flood plain management and flood-proofing
standards for communities participating in national flood plain management); 41
Fed. Reg. 24,909 (1976) (Delaware River Basin Commission Standards for flood plain
construction).
444. R.S. NORTON, JR., DESIGNING STABLE STREAM SYSTEMS IN AN URBAN
ENVIRONMENT (American Soc'y of Agricultural Engineers, Chicago, Ill., Paper No.
75-2546, December 15-18, 1975).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss5/1

66

Weston: Gone with the Water - Drainage Rights and Storm Water Management

1976-1977]

PENNSYLVANIA WATER MANAGEMENT

has been reduced. 4 1 5 This may be credited more to the cooperative
efforts between developers, engineers, the SCS district staff, and
municipal officials in designing sophisticated runoff programs
rather than to the simple application of the storm water regulations.
Mere adoption of a one hundred-year storm criteria will not ensure
that runoff from less intensive rainfall events will remain at the
predevelopment level or that downstream damage will be avoided.
The DVRPC recommendations for storm water management do
not adopt a single design storm as a model but suggest that different
criteria would be appropriate under various conditions, depending
upon the extent and nature of property to be protected, the watershed
characteristics, and the aspect of the drainage system under
consideration. 446 While this article does not attempt to resolve these
technical issues or to recommend a definitive set of standards,
lawyers, legislators, administrators, and local officials should be
aware that such questions exist for which easy answers are
unavailable.
3.

Lehigh-Northampton Joint Planning Commission Drainage
Plan

Perhaps the most ambitious effort outside the Delaware Valley
to consider all aspects of storm water management on a regional
basis was undertaken by the Joint Planning Commission of LehighNorthampton Counties (JPC). In response to the increasing concern
over the intermunicipal impact of accelerated storm runoff and flood
control 44 7 and the need for a regional plan to qualify local projects
under the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development's (HUD) Basic Water and Sewer Facilities grant
program, 44 the JPC prepared one of the Commonwealth's first truly

comprehensive regional storm water management plans. As adopted
in August 1975, the Lehigh-Northampton Regional Storm Drainage
Plan (JPC Plan) 449 encompasses a broad range of topics, including 1)

methods of analyzing storm runoff, 2) runoff analyses for various
watersheds to be used by municipal officials in reviewing develop445. Interview with George Coller, supra note 437. The prime example cited for
runoff reduction of small as well as large storms through systems designed for the

100-year storm is Exton Mall in Chester County, which utilizes roof and parking lot
retention systems. Id.
446. DRVPC REGIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 428, at 10-11.
447. A.

O'DELL, REGIONAL STORM DRAINAGE PLAN -

1976 SUPPLEMENT 1 (1976)

(Joint Planning Commission Lehigh-Northampton Counties); Interview with Alan
O'Dell, Chief Planner, Joint Planning Commission in Lehigh-Northampton Counties
(August 27, 1976).
448. See 42 U.S.C. § 3102(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 555.1-.9 (1976).
449. A. O'DELL, W. THURBER, & J. FRITZ, supra note 241 (adopted by JPC in 1975).
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ment plans, 3) the flow of storm water into sanitary sewer systems,
4) identification of critical drainage problems, 5) flood plain
management, 6) alternative structural and non structural measures
to handle runoff problems, and 7) an implementation program.
One Qf the most important consequences of the JPC Plan, for
state as well as local officials, was a demonstration of the costeffectiveness of maintaining natural swales and drainage channels
and requiring storm water control and retention in subdivision
plans. The JPC compared the cost of natural grass swale channel
maintenance with various storm sewer alternatives, such as metal
and reinforced concrete pipe, paved surface, and plain rubble, to
establish the required flow capacities. 4 s° Applying a detailed
analysis to one 620-acre watershed in the JPC region, the planners
considered two possible storm drainage systems. One system
required the use of natural swales as part of any new developments,
ranging from forty to eighty feet in width, protected from encroachment by easement or dedication, and augmented by flow retardation
devices such as detention basins. 51 The second approach contemplated the installation of a storm sewer system ranging from
seventy-two to ninety-six inches in diameter. 45 2 The storm sewer
system would cause runoff to reach the mouth of the watershed in
twenty minutes, compared to approximately forty minutes for a
natural swale. 45 3 Peak flows at the bottom of the watershed would be
thirty percent higher with the storm sewers. 454 In a ten-year storm,
flows in the lower reaches of the drainage area with the pipe system
would be approximately 1225 cubic feet per second, whereas the flow
455
with the swales would be reduced to 800 cubic feet per second.
Under the pipe proposal, several existing culverts would require
replacement or improvement in order to accommodate the higher
runoff flows. 45 6 The total project cost for the storm sewer system was
estimated at $2.4 million - in 1973 dollars - not counting more
severe downstream flooding problems exacerbated by the higher
peak flows. 45 7 In contrast, a natural swale/new development
retention system would require twelve acres of open space, which
45
could be made available for recreation, and would cost $200,000. 8
Engineers for the JPC roughly estimated that retention basins with
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.

Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 89-90.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.

457. Id. at 91.
458. Id. at 88-91.
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a capacity of 50,000 to 100,000 cubic feet, which would serve a typical
moderate to large subdivision, could cost $5,000 to $10,000 if
constructed as part of the initial site development. Annual maintenance for grass mowing and debris clearance was estimated at $500
to $1000.

459

In all areas except highly urbanized ones, and particularly in
rural and suburban communities, preservation of natural drainage
systems and careful development planning to prevent accelerated
runoff is the most cost-effective solution. Post hoc correction of
drainage and flooding problems is not only expensive, but often
ineffective. As the JPC Plan underscores, predevelopment planning
for storm water management can save developers, homeowners, and
taxpayers money and misery.

IV.

STATE AND FEDERAL PROGRAMS RELATED TO STORM
WATER MANAGEMENT

A series of state and federal programs relate directly and
indirectly to drainage and storm water management in the
Commonwealth. Of these, the most important for the purposes of
this discussion include: 1) state and federal flood control facilities
and stream improvement programs; 2) dams and encroachments
regulations; 3) erosion and sedimentation control measures; and 4)
national flood insurance and flood plain management requirements.
A brief description of the scope and effect of these programs is
necessary to a more thorough comprehension of the state's storm
water management problem and its potential solutions.
A.

Structural Flood Control and Stream Improvement Programs

Both the Commonwealth, through the DER,460 and the federal
government, through the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)461 and
the SCS 462 engage in a wide variety of structural flood control and
stream improvement projects. These activities include the construction of dams, dikes, levees and floodwalls, culvert and bridge

459. Id. at 95.

460. In 1971, the Pennsylvania DER succeeded to the powers and duties relating
to flood control projects formerly vested in the Water & Power Resources Board and
the Department of Forests & Waters. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-1 (Supp. 1977-78).

State flood control studies are conducted pursuant to a series of statutory provisions,
including id. §§510-4(7), -5, -9(1); id. tit. 32, §§653-672 (Purdon 1967 & Supp.
1977-78).
461. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-709a (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For a history and description
of federal flood control activities, see 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 310-315 (R.E.
Clark ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as 4 WATER RIGHTS].
462. See 33 U.S.C. § 701b-1 (1970); 16 id. §§ 1001-1009 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

69

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [1977], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

22: p. 901

enlargements, and channel clearance and modification projects. 463
Such projects are usually undertaken on a cooperative, jointsponsorship basis by federal, state, and local agencies. Federal
participation in local flood protection projects, other than dams and
channel rectification programs, is dependent upon state and local
acquisition of the necessary lands and a commitment to operate and
maintain the works. 4 64 Generally the state will reimburse a locality
for up to fifty percent of the cost of the land and other local expenses
incurred under federal projects. 465 If the state sponsors a local
protection project, the local government must acquire the lands and
DER will undertake the design, engineering, and construction;
thereafter, maintenance is a local responsibility.466 For dam and
stream rectification projects, responsibility for land acquisition,
design, construction, and maintenance is generally assumed by the
sponsoring federal agency 46 7 or DER 468 except for incidental
469
recreational or multiple purpose facilities.

Since the late 1930's the Commonwealth has sponsored seventyeight flood control projects and 1,018 stream improvement projects,
for a total expenditure of over $60 million. 470

The Corps has

463. The Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) activities focus on the construction of
multipurpose

projects and flood

protection

structures, such

as dams,

levees,

floodwalls, and channel improvements, where a high degree of flood protection is
required due to the magnitude of potential flood damages (exceeding $2 million), or
protection can be provided most economically by local structures, such as levees or
walls. 4 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 461, § 311.2. SCS efforts concentrate on watershed
protection through runoff retardation and erosion prevention, land and water
conservation, and structural measures that involve agricultural or urban areas
subject to intermediate flood problems (potential damages less than $2 million). See 33
U.S.C. §701b-1 (1970); 16 id. §§1001-1009 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975); SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, WATERSHED PROTECTION HANDBOOK,

Pt. 1, App. 5 (1967).
464. 33 U.S.C. §§ 701c, 701c-1 (1970); 16 id. § 1004(1) (Supp. V. 1975).
465. Memorandum from John E. McSparran, Chief, Div. of Comprehensive
Resources Programming to R. Timothy Weston, Assistant Attny. Gen., Pa. Dep't of
Environmental Resources (November 22, 1976) (on file with R. Timothy Weston, Pa.
Dep't of Environmental Resources, Harrisburg, Pa.).
466. See Div. OF WATER RESOURCES PROJECTS, BUREAU OF RESOURCES
PROGRAMMING,
AGREEMENT

PA. DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL

(1976);

OFFICE

OF

RESOURCES

RESOURCES,

MANAGEMENT,

VIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, FLOOD CONTROL MANUAL

STANDARD
PA.

DEP'T

PROJECT
OF

EN-

5-7 (1975).

467. 33 U.S.C. §701c-1 (1970).
468. Interview with Robert P. Adams, Chief, Div. of Water Resources Projects, Bur.
of Resources Programming, Pa. Dep't of Environmental Resources (August 18, 1976).
469. With respect to federal projects, local and state cosponsors are encouraged to
assume responsibility for the collateral operation of recreational, fishing, and hunting
facilities. See 16 U.S.C. §§4601-12 to -14 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). State sponsored
projects primarily involve recreational facilities operated under the state park
program. Interview with John E. McSparran, Chief, Div. of Comprehensive Resources
Programming, Pa. Dep't of Environmental Resources (July 19, 1977).
470. Memorandum from Robert P. Adams, Chief, Div. of Water Resource Projects,
Pa. Dep't of Environmental Resources to R. Timothy Weston, Assistant Attny. Gen.,
Pa. Dep't of Environmental Resources (August 19, 1976) (on file with R. Timothy
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expended over $638 million on twenty-five major reservoir projects
and has installed thirty-four local protection projects requiring $117
47 1
million in federal aid and $24.8 million in state and local funds.
The SCS has supplied sixty-four small flood retention reservoirs for
a total cost of $68 million, and expended almost $3 million in
47 2
emergency post-flood stream projects.
Several recent disasters demonstrated the benefits of flood
projects undertaken by state and federal agencies over the past four
decades. 473 It was estimated that statewide natural flood damages
would average $258 million annually were it not for federal and state
flood control structures, which have reduced annual damages to a
residual of $66 million. 474 But flood control projects are neither
inexpensive nor foolproof. A dam or levee is only effective within its
design limitations. 475 It appears flood control efforts have given
many communities which lie behind walls or downstream of dams a
false sense of security. Construction in flood-prone areas has
continued largely unabated in many municipalities. 476 A combination of increased runoff 477 and more damage-prone investments in
the flood path has eroded the effectiveness of Pennsylvania's current
structural control measures. More structural projects are unlikely to
resolve the problem. Initial analysis by the Pennsylvania State
Water Plan indicates few cost-effective flood control projects on the
horizon.4 78 For many communities, the cost of modern dams and
dikes far exceeds the amount of damages that such structures would
ameliorate. Moreover, the environmental and social impact of dams
and dikes virtually precludes universal use of these measures. Other
Weston, Pa. Dep't of Environmental Resources, Harrisburg, Pa.); Memorandum from
John B. Barnhard, Chief, Div. of Stream Improvement, Dep't of Environmental
Resources to R. Timothy Weston, Assistant Attny. Gen., Pa. Dep't of Environmental
Resources (June 29, 1976) (on file with R. Timothy Weston, Pa. Dep't of Environmental Resources, Harrisburg, Pa.).
471. N. ATLANTIC DIVISION, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, WATER RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA (1975).

472. Interview with Clinton Johnson, Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture (September 9, 1976) (all data as of July 1975).
473. See

BALTIMORE DIST., UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

FLOOD REPORT, TROPICAL STORM AGNES, JUNE
AND

POTOMAC

RIVERS AND

MARYLAND

1972,

II

POST

BASINS OF THE SUSQUEHANNA

PORTIONS OF THE CHESAPEAKE

BAY AND

ATLANTIC COAST 111-23 (1974); PITTSBURGH DIST., UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, II POST FLOOD REPORT, TROPICAL STORM AGNES, JUNE 1972 TECHNICAL REPORT 35-40 (1974).

474. Memorandum, supra note 465.
475. When those limits are exceeded, as occurred in Wilkes-Barre when the levees
failed during the June 1972 floods, disaster strikes. See A. MUSSARI, APPOINTMENT
WITH DISASTER: THE SWELLING OF THE FLOOD (1974).

476. See id. at 8-9. As of mid-1977, only 51 Pennsylvania communities had adopted
flood plain management controls fully meeting federal flood insurance requirements.
See notes 525-530 and accompanying text infra.
477. See note 7 supra.
478. See BUREAU OF RESOURCES PROGRAMMING,
RESOURCES, STATE WATER PLAN, SUBBASINS

PA. DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL

1-20, ch. 4, pt. B (1977).
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solutions must be sought and implemented to bring the Commonwealth's flood damages under control.
B. Nonstructural Measures and Flood Plain Management
Until recently, the prime emphasis of state and federal flood
control efforts have concentrated on structural projects to reduce
flows, redirect flood waters, or shield communities behind dikes and
walls. However, since the late 1960's there has been a strong trend
toward fuller utilization of nonstructural alternatives and flood plain
management techniques. Among the important elements of nonstructural, flood area management efforts have been 1) open space,
recreational, and urban renewal projects to preserve flood hazard
areas, 2) flood plain zoning and building code ordinances to regulate
flood area construction, 3) "floodproofing" of buildings located in
flood plains, 4) flood warning systems, and 5) flood insurance
programs.
Since 1974, the Corps, SCS and other federal agencies engaged
in developing flood projects have been statutorily directed to
consider fully "non-structural alternatives to prevent or reduce flood
damages .. . with a view toward formulating the most economi-

cally, socially, and environmentally acceptable means of reducing or
preventing flood damages." 479 Nonstructural measures can be
financed to the same extent and in comparable federal/local shares
as local structural projects. 480 By removing major financial disincentives to nonstructural measures, the new federal funding provisions
allow a wider range of options to the Commonwealth and its
communities in selecting the best combination of programs to
manage flood damages.
State law authorizing DER sponsorship and participation in
flood control programs is still limited to traditional structural
approaches, however. 48

1

No provisions exist allowing DER to

finance floodproofing or to acquire floodway lands and easements in
order to assure unobstructed passage of flood waters. Relocation
assistance for damage-prone facilities to remove them from the flood
path is not contemplated by Pennsylvania's current laws. Other
state and local powers, such as urban renewal 48 2 and park
479. 33 U.S.C. §701b-11(a) (Supp. V 1975).
480. Id. §701b-11(b) (local sponsors must contribute up to 20 percent of project
costs on a basis comparable to the value of lands, easements, and rights-of-way which
would have been required for local flood control structural measures).
481. See note 460 supra.
482. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1701-1747. (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1977-78). Some of
the most blighted areas are left in the wake of massive urban flooding, such as that
which struck the Wyoming and .Susquehanna valleys in 1972. Where older structures,
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development, 48 3 not necessarily intended as flood control measures,
are available and in a few instances have been less than successfully
used to effect nonstructural solutions for flood problems.4 84 A clear,
rational approach to planning and financing for the optimal
combination of flood control measures has yet to be incorporated
into state law.
C.

Water Obstructions Regulation

The DER regulates most Pennsylvania waters and is authorized
to issue permits for water obstructions and stream encroachments
under the 1913 Water Obstructions Act (Obstructions Act).485 The
statute, passed in response to a series of devastating floods, is
designed to minimize dangers to life and property caused by
improper design and maintenance of structures or obstructions of
flood flows.

486

Although the Obstructions Act refers to encroach-

ments "along" streams, 48 7 this potential jurisdiction has not been
undesigned to meet flood hazards, are substantially damaged beyond the financial
means or will of existing owners to repair, redevelopment may be one of the few viable
options available. Wisely used, it may aid in storm water and flood management.
Damage-prone structures may be replaced with uses more compatible with flood plain
locations or buildings designed to comply with modern flood-proofing standards. For
structures which can be saved, resale to new owners may be conditioned upon
implementing restorative work which will reduce flood damage potentials, such as
relocation of electrical, heating, and plumbing systems.
483. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§510-2(1), -2(2), -6 (Supp. 1977-78) (state park
authorization); id. tit. 16, § 2501(b) (county parks); id. tit. 53, §§3181-3195 (Purdon
1974) (general municipal law); id. §§ 24101, 24191 (Purdon 1957) (second class cities);
id. § 38703 (third class cities); id. § 47702 (Purdon 1966) (boroughs); id. § 58001 (Purdon
1957) (first class townships); id. § 66901 (second class townships). Flood plains, in
addition to representing hazard zones, are often attractive recreation and open space
assets. See generally R. MANN, RIVERS IN THE CITY (1973); PA. ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY

BD.,

ENVIRONMENTAL

MASTER

PLAN,

POLICIES

FOR

CRITICAL EN-

(1976). A number of notable state, county, and municipal
parks have been located in riverine flood plains, providing, particularly in urban
areas, valuable public access to waterborne activities and aesthetic opportunities.
484. Such programs were, for example, undertaken by ,Tunkhannock and
Lewisburg Boroughs. Tunkhannock Borough used state bond "Project 500" funds to
convert eleven single family dwellings, one multifamily dwelling and a fertilizer
blending plant, all of which had been heavily damaged by Hurricane Agnes, into a
passive community park. "Project 500" funds were made available in the Land and
Water Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5101-5121 (Supp.
1977-78).
485. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 681-691 (Purdon 1967); see id. tit. 71, §§ 510-1 (1),
-4(2) (Supp. 1977-78) (transferring powers of former Water and Power Resources
Board to DER). "Water obstructions" are statutorily defined to include "any dam,
wall, wing-wall, wharf, embankment, abutment, projection, bridge, or similar or
analogous structure, or any other obstruction whatsoever, in, along, across, or
projecting into or being in any stream or body of water ...... Id. tit. 32, § 681 (Purdon
1967).
486. See Water & Power Resources Bd. v. Green Springs Co., 394 Pa. 1, 145 A.2d
178 (1958), which contains a discussion of the historical setting and legislative
purposes of the Water Obstructions Act. Id. at 3-12, 145 A.2d at 180-83.
487. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 681 (Purdon 1967).
VIRONMENTAL AREAS 10-11
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defined or generally expanded to cover all flood plain development. 4s8 Similarly, while the statute regulates activities that change
"the course, current or cross section of streams,"4 8 9 DER has not
broadly applied the Obstructions Act to development that increases
49
the quantity or velocity of runoff flowing to and in watercourses. 0
The core of the statute is aimed at physical structures, such as dams,
culverts and bridges, and at channel modifications which may
491
impede stream flows and exacerbate flood damages.
The effectiveness of the Commonwealth's water obstructions
program is hindered by several problems. First, since the Obstructions Act is only one of several water obstructions laws, 492 a maze of
overlapping and contradictory jurisdictions and inconsistent standards have resulted. While DER regulations cover all categories of
encroachments in most parts of the state, the Navigation Commission for the Delaware River 493 and the City of Philadelphia 494 have
exclusive jurisdiction over portions of the Delaware River and its
tributaries. 495 The Navigation Commission and the city, however,
traditionally regulate harbor structures only for purposes of
navigation protection; 496 they do not cover other encroachments, nor
are they explicitly mandated to consider flood obstruction potential
and environmental impacts. Second, the existing obstructions laws
provide little flexibility in establishing the priorities of the Common488. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 105.1-.158 (1976). In a few instances, DER has on an
individual case basis required permits for buildings or fill located on riparian flood
plain lands immediately adjacent to water courses. See, e.g., Memorandum from R.
Timothy Weston to Vaden R. Butler, Chief, Div. of Dams and Encroachments (April 4,
1973) (level of flood plain of Bowman's Creek).
489. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 682 (Purdon 1967).
490. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 105.1-.158 (1976). For a discussion of erosion and
sedimentation regulations under other state statutory authority, see notes 492-498
and accompanying text infra.
491. Water & Power Resources Bd. v. Green Springs Co., 394 Pa. 1, 10, 145 A.2d
178, 183 (1958); see 25 PA. CODE §§ 105.1-.158 (1976).
492. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, §§ 1-16 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1977-78); id. tit. 71,
§ 670.2 (Supp. 1977-78); id. § 510-4(2); id. tit. 53, §§ 14198-14200 (Purdon 1957);
PHILADELPHIA CODE §18-101 to -103
(1973); 351 PA. CODE §4.4-500(b) (1974)
(Philadelphia Home Rule Charter).
493. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, § 1-16 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1977-78); id. tit. 71, § 670.2
(Supp. 1977-78).
494. PHILADELPHIA CODE § 18- 101 to -103 (1973); 351 PA. CODE § 4.4-500(b) (1974)
(Philadelphia Home Rule Charter).
495. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 681, 690 (Purdon 1967). While the Obstructions
Act excludes all projects in the tidal portions of the Delaware River and its navigable
tributaries and all projects subject to either the Navigation Commission or City of
Philadelphia regulation from the jurisdiction of the DER, the Delaware River
Navigation Act specifically declares that no license issued by the Navigation
Commission "shall be valid until a permit is granted by the Water and Power
Resources Board [now DER]." Id. tit. 55, § 7 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1977-78).
496. See 7 PA. BULLETIN 1239-46 (May 7, 1977); PHILADELPHIA CODE § 18-101 to
-103 (1973).
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975

wealth's regulatory programs. Permits are required for a wide
variety of obstructions but no authority is provided for "general

permits"'4 97 or waivers for minor classes of obstructions. Third, there
are no provisions encouraging or requiring self-monitoring and
maintenance by obstruction owners and operators. The entire
burden of reviewing over 1,000 applications annually and monitoring over 7,000 existing major obstructions is placed on a professional
498
staff of thirteen.
In addition to state obstructions programs, the Corps regulates
obstructions and channel modifications in navigable waters of the

United States, 499 including all or major parts of the Ohio, Beaver,
Mahoning,

Monongahela,

Allegheny, Kiskininetas, Conemaugh,

Clarion, Delaware, Schuylkill, and Susquehanna Rivers,5 under the
1899 Rivers and Harbors Act. 5° 1 The Corps also exercises regulatory
jurisdiction over the discharge of dredged and fill materials in "all
waters of the United States" 5 2 under section 404 of the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act, 503 and is responsible for implementing
a dam safety inspection program.104 The Corps' programs are
basically limited to traditional obstruction regulation activities, with
a sensitivity toward other environmental factors. 5° 5 Its authority
does not encompass broader elements of a comprehensive storm
water management effort, but the Corps may assist in assuring
proper design and maintenance of potential obstructions if eventually coordinated with state and local storm water and flood plain
plans and programs.

497. "General permits" provide general authorization for certain classes of
obstructions that meet standardized criteria and are published as regulations or
public notices, alleviating the need for individual project sponsors to submit separate
plans and obtain separate permits for each minor obstruction. See 33 C.F.R.
§209.120(i)(2)(ix) (1976), 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,335 (1975) (Corps regulations
authorizing general permits for certain activities under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975)).
498. Interview with Vaden R. Butler, Chief, Div. of Dams and Encroachments, Pa.
Dep't of Environmental Resources (August 9, 1976).
499. Navigable waters of the United States are defined to encompass those "waters
that have been used in the past, are now used or are susceptible to use as means to
transport interstate commerce" and those "waters that are subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide." 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(d)(1) (1976); see Weston, Public Rights in
Pennsylvania Waters, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 515, 516-28, 536-38 (1976).
500. Weston, supra note 499, App. II (Pa. State Water Plan Water Laws and Inst.
Arrangements Background Rep. No. 1, 1976).
501. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1970).
502. Id. § 1362(7) (Supp. V 1975).
503. Id. § 1344; see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp.
685 (D.D.C. 1975); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), affl'd, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974).
504. 33 U.S.C. §§ 467-467e (Supp. V 1975).
505. See 7 C.F.R. § 622.14 (1976).
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Both the Susquehanna50 6 and Delaware River Basin Commissions507 are empowered to establish standards and review projects
having a substantial effect on basin waters, including major
obstruction and flood control measures.50 8 With the exception of the
Delaware River Basin Commission's recently adopted flood plain
management standards,50 9 both commissions have relied upon
5 10
general policy guidelines in reviewing new obstructions projects.
Despite somewhat vague criteria, the commission programs could
potentially provide a major contribution to storm water and
encroachment management in the eastern two-thirds of the Commonwealth. Unfortunately, realization of this potential is hindered
51
by the extremely limited resources available to the basin agencies. '
As a result, most commission attention must remain focused on
projects with interstate or basin-wide ramifications. The authority to
regulate obstructions or runoff acceleration remains primarily with
the states, which are often, as in Pennsylvania, similarly
constrained by budget and staff shortages.
D. Erosion and Sedimentation Control
Since 1972, DER has administered regulations adopted under
the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law5 1 2 to control erosion and

sedimentation resulting from earth moving activities. 51 3 The rules
require the formulation of plans for erosion control for all earth
moving 51 4 and the acquisition of permits for large projects.51 5
Although most of the technical criteria for erosion control measures
are primarily directed at pollution prevention, many of the
standards relating to the collection of runoff, 516 sedimentation basin
design 51 7 and velocity control 518 have a direct relation to regulation
50b. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970)
(codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§820.1-.8 (Supp. 1977-78)) [hereinafter cited as
SRBC Compact].

507. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961) (codified at
tit. 32, § 815.101 (Purdon 1967)) [hereinafter cited at DRBC Compact].
508. SRBC Compact §§ 3.4(2), .10, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 820.1 (Supp. 1977-78);
DRBC Compact §§ 3.6(b), .8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 815.101 (Purdon 1967).
PA. STAT. ANN.

509. 42 Fed. Reg. 13,541 (1977).
510. See DELAWARE RIVER BASIN
§§ 2.100, 2.150 (1976); SUSQUEHANNA

COMM'N, WATER CODE DELAWARE RIVER BASIN
RIVER BASIN COMM'N, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
FOR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATER RESOURCES OF THE
SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN 54, 56 (1973).

511. Interview with Peter Carlucci, Assistant to the Executive Director, Susquehanna River Basin Comm'n (August 10, 1976); Interview with David Everett, Chief,
Project Rev. Branch, Delaware River Basin Comm'n (March 22, 1976).
512. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §691.402 (Supp. 1977-78).
513. 25 PA. CODE §§ 102.1-.51 (1974).
514. Id. § 102.4.
515. Id. § 102.31(a) (applicable to projects affecting 25 acres or more).
516. Id. § 102.12(f).
517. Id. § 102.13(d).
518. Id. §§ 102.12(c), .13(a)(3), (b)(3), (c).
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of accelerated drainage and storm water management. The program's use as a storm water management tool is enhanced by
cooperative arrangements between DER, the State Conservation
Commission, county conservation districts, and the SCS in administering the rules.5 19 Several local governments and conservation
districts have combined erosion control, watershed protection
projects, and flood plain management into a relatively sophisticated
approach to storm water problems. 520 Unfortunately, such a holistic
approach has not been adopted across the Commonwealth.
E. Flood Plain Management
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended in
1973,521 provides for a nationwide program of federally subsidized

flood insurance, conditioned upon active management and regulation of flood plain development by state and local governments. In
areas identified as flood hazard zones by HUD, no federal financial
assistance for acquisition or construction purposes, including, for
example, sewage treatment plans and highway grants, any loan or
mortgage from a federally regulated or insured financial institution,
and no federal disaster relief is authorized unless federal flood
insurance is acquired. 522 For citizens, businesses, or government
agencies to acquire the insurance, the community must be eligible
for participation in the program,5 23 which necessitates adoption and
implementation of ordinances regulating flood plain development
meeting HUD standards following receipt of maps financed by the
5
Federal Government.

24

Although over 2,150 of Pennsylvania's 2,469 identified floodprone municipalities have applied for participation in the federal
flood insurance program,5 25 some 290 have failed to qualify for
519. Interview with Richard D. Van Noy, Chief, Div. of Conservation Districts,
Bureau of Soil and Water Conservation, Pa. Dep't of Environmental Resources (July
1, 1976).
520. Particularly active programs now operate, among other places, in Bucks,
Montgomery, Chester and Lancaster Counties. Id.
521. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4127 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
522. Id. §§ 4012a, 4105-4106 (Supp. V 1975); 12 C.F.R. §§ 22.0-.6; 390.0-.5, 760.0-.2
(1977); 24 C.F.R. 2200.39 (1975). It should be noted, however, that amendments to the
National Flood Insurance Act, pending before Congress at the time of this
publication, would remove the prohibition against loans and mortgages from
federally insured or regulated financial institutions for nonparticipating communities,
and instead require that notification of the flooding hazard be made to borrowers.
H.R. 6655, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701, 123 CONG. REC. H4296-306 (daily ed. May 11,
1977); S. 1523, 95th Cong.; 1st Sess. § 312, 123 CONG. REc. S8970-71, 9042 (daily ed.
June 6, 1977).
523. 42 U.S.C. § 4012 (1970).
524. Id. §§ 4101, 4104-4106 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1910.3 (1975).
525. Files of the Bureau of Community Planning Flood Insurance, Pa. Dep't of
Community Affairs (as of July 18, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Files]; FED. INs. AD.,
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eligibility and are now severed from the availability of flood
insurance and federal assistance.5 26 A large number of communities
are participating in the program under expedited emergency
procedures, 527 under which they need only adopt a resolution of
intent to promulgate the necessary ordinances. 528 However, many
such municipalities have not yet adopted the required flood plain
management ordinances. 529 According to HUD estimates, approximately ten percent of Pennsylvania's communities have adopted and
are implementing flood plain ordinances which comply with federal
requirements, 53° and HUD has gradually started to suspend
noncomplying municipalities from the program.
As presently conducted, the federal insurance and municipal
flood plain management program does not require or effectively
encourage coordination of storm water and flood plan programs by
all local governments located in a watershed. State statutory
authority to compel comprehensive, rational management programs
for all of Pennsylvania's flood-prone watersheds has been proposed,5 31 but does not yet exist.
In addition to the federal flood insurance and municipal
regulatory programs, both the Susquehanna and Delaware River
Basin Commissions have discrete powers within the flood plain
management field to conduct studies of flood plains, establish
standards for development on flood plain lands, and provide
technical assistance to communities for implementation of the
standards. 532 The Susquehanna Commission has concentrated its
efforts in the technical assistance area. 533 While the Susquehanna

Commission's authority to regulate flood plains is dependent upon
the consent of the signatory state, 534 the Delaware Commission's
U.S.

DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNITIES PARTICIPATING IN
THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM AS OF APRIL 30, 1§77, AND AREAS WHICH
HAVE HAD SPECIAL FLOOD AREAS IDENTIFIED - NOT IN THE PROGRAM AS OF APRIL

30, 1977, 228-66, 400-04 (1977) (computer printout).
526. FED. INS. AD., supra note 525, at 404.

527. Id. at 266. According to HUD figures, over 90 percent of all Pennsylvania
communities presently participating in the insurance program come under the
"emergency" provisions.

Id.

528. Interview with Dave Thomas, Philadelphia Regional Office, Fed. Ins. Ad.,
U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development (August 13, 1976).
529. Id.
530. Id. As of July 1977, only 194 of Pennsylvania's flood prone communities had
adopted the complete set of zoning, subdivision, and building code ordinances
required for eligibility under the regular program. Files,

supra note 525.

531. See, e.g., S.B. 743, S.B. 744, Pa. Legislature, 1977 Sess.
532. SRBC Compact § 6.2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 820.1 (Supp. 1977-78); DRBC
Compact § 6.2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 815.101 (Purdon 1967).
533. See FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT SUBCOMM'N, PA WATER RESOURCES
COORDINATING COMM'N, INVENTORY OF PROGRAMS OF GOVERNMENTAL AND OTHER
AGENCIES PERTAINING TO FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT K-1 (1974).
534. SRBC Compact §6.2(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §820.1 (Supp. 1977-78).
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powers are not so conditioned. Recently adopted standards establish
criteria for both municipal flood plain management in the Delaware
River basin and rules to guide commission review of projects located
535
in the flood plains of the Delaware River and its major tributaries.
V.

CONCLUSION

At this point, one observation is clear: Pennsylvania's law
relation to storm water management is a treacherous maze of largely
archaic and incoherent dogmas and only partially effective institutional arrangements. Critical assessment of the major problems
discussed in this article suggests the following goals and criteria
that Pennsylvania's future storm water management policy must or
should address.
1. A more holistic, coordinated approach to storm water
management is essential. The storm water problem cannot be neatly
segmented into questions of diffuse surface water drainage rights,
water obstruction regulation, flood control, and flood plain management. These are all facets of the same basic issue: How shall storm
water and its consequences be managed in order to avoid injury to
persons and property and to promote important economic, social,
and environmental values? This does not necessarily mean that one
institution, agency, or level of government must assume exclusive
control of all aspects of managing storm runoff and its consequences. It does require, however, a more integrated approach by all
concerned, buttressed by clearly enunciated public policies and laws.
2. Priorplanning is a prerequisite to any rationalstorm water
management program. It is obvious that our current ad hoc
approach to the resolution of storm water problems is self-defeating.
After land development is completed, it is difficult to reverse its
effects on drainage. Post-development structural remedies are almost
always far more expensive and less successful than the options
available if adequate prior planning had been undertaken and
implemented by developers and government. 536
3. Storm water management policy should conserve natural
drainage characteristics as part of an economically efficient and
equitable program. As a fundamental goal of storm water law, each
person should be required to use his land in ways that will minimize
injury to his neighbors. The prime objective in all land development
should be to retain, to the maximum extent possible, natural
drainage characteristics, 537 and avoid an increase in the peak
535. 42 Fed. Reg. 13,541 (1977).
536. See A. O'DELL, supra note 241, at 88-91; 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12,
§ 457.5.
537. See DVRPC REGIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 428; A. O'DELL, supra note
241; 5 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 12, §457.3.
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quantity and velocity of storm water discharges. Contrary to the
assumptions of some early drainage cases, a rule which requires all
property owners to exercise reasonable care to control runoff does
not impose undue financial burdens on economic development.
Creative use of natural characteristics, onsite controls, and community drainage systems can save millions of dollars in flood damages
at less cost than the current unprofitable war of pipes and dikes. 38
4. For any solution to be successful, intermunicipal conflicts
must be resolved and storm water problems must be addressed on a
watershed-wide basis. Storm water problems arise in and affect
hydrologic units defined by drainage watersheds. Up to now, most of
these problems have been addressed on a different basis, by
municipalities acting independently and often at cross-purposes with
their neighbors. No one community alone can solve the storm water
management problem. Unfortunately, those municipalities which
are most vulnerable often have the least control over the activities
threatening their lives and property. 539 Only a watershed approach
can hope to resolve or prevent these conflicts, and assure harmonious, productive, and safe economic development in all communities.
5. Drainage rules should retain essential flexibility while
providing sufficient certainty to guide private and public development decisions. Without a stable, clear, and understandable set of
rules, private parties and public bodies cannot adequately design
and tailor their decisions affecting drainage. Preventive action to
avoid conflicts is discouraged by contradictory doctrines and
conflicting policy pronouncements. Moreover, if Pennsylvania's law
continues to provide little or no predictable security against
avoidable storm water damages, the economic well-being of land
investments may become increasingly uncertain.
6. Storm water management should be sensitive to and
compatible with the attainment of other water resource and
environmental objectives. Particular sensitivity should be given to
the relation between storm water management and groundwater,
water quality, and pollution control. If storm water management
pursues the traditional course toward larger collection systems and
channels to dispose of runoff as quickly as possible, there is little
doubt that groundwater availability will be impaired and stream
538. See A. O'DELL, supra note 241, at 88-94.
539. Interview with Alan O'Dell, Chief Planner, Joint Planning Comm'n of
Lehigh-Northampton Counties (August 27, 1976); Hearings on Senate Bill No. 1122
before the Pa. House of Representatives, Comm'n on Local Gov't (Oct, 23, 1974)
(Statements of Evellen Kim and Carmin Arndt) (problems of Lewisburg Borough in
managing accelerated runoff from new industrial, commercial, and residential
developments in adjoining townships).
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sedimentation aggravated. 40 On the other hand, creative use of
retention techniques, natural ponding and swale systems, and
similar approaches to prevent accelerated runoff may ameliorate
storm water problems, enhance recharge of groundwater aquifers,
and control pollution.
7. Storm water management considerations should be an
integral aspect of land use planning and development programs.
Storm water management is both a water resource issue and a land
use problem. It is not uncommon for land use planning and
development regulation on the local, county, and state level to
neglect considerations of storm water constraints. Until storm water
management and land use planning are merged, the solution to
Pennsylvania's drainage and flood problem will remain elusive.
8. Future storm water management programs must be capable
of administrationand implemented through realistic manpower and
budgetary resources. The current melange of laws and programs
relating to storm water management is administered by the courts
and a large variety of agencies, few of which have the resources to
approach realistically the problem or implement their assigned
tasks.5 411 A private citizen confronting a drainage problem is
provided with virtually one alternative: to spend years and a fortune
in protracted litigation with only a modest chance of effective relief.
Clearly the solutions will not be simple or cheap. But with annual
flood damages averaging $100 million since 1936, an allocation of
resources to effect a rational storm water program would seem an
attractive public investment.
Each year, Pennsylvanians experience the frustrating dividends
of storm water mismanagement. From eroded fields and inundated
basements to disastrous floods, every community and watershed is
confronted by and contributes to the Commonwealth's mounting
drainage and flooding problem. Billions of dollars in public and
private investment have flowed with the water to the sea. The
technical understanding of the storm water issue and its potential
solutions has advanced greatly in the first half of the twentieth
century. The policies and framework of the legal and institutional
bodies have been much slower to evolve and address the challenge.
540. BUREAU
VIRONMENTAL

OF ENVIRONMENTAL MASTER PLANNING, PA. DEP'T OF ENMASTER PLAN,
POLICY
ENVIRONMENTAL
RESOURCES,

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL AREAS

(1977).

541. The DER, for example, administers the Commonwealth's water obstructions
program, including the review of over 1000 applications annually and the monitoring
of over 7000 major existing obstructions, with a professional staff of only 13. The
Delaware River Basin Commission has a staff of two assigned to review all major
water resource projects in the basin.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

81

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [1977], Art. 1

982

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

22: p. 901

Drainage and flood control problems may never be completely
resolved, but common sense and rational legal reforms could greatly
ameliorate the rising tide of storm water conflicts. The choice is
largely up to Pennsylvania's citizens and their representatives.
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